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genuine coins of which those alleged to have been made are imitations: United States v. Burns, 5 McLean 23.
It is not error to instruct the jury that they may infer that gin
is intoxicating, without any evidence of its properties or qualities:
Commonwealth v. Peckham, 2 Gray 514. And the same is true
of whiskey: -Eganv. State, 53 Ind. 162. But not of malt liquors :
Shaw v. State, 56 Ind. 188. But whether or not benzine is of a
like nature with camphene or spirit gas, is not a matter of which
the court can take judicial notice ; it must be left to the jury:
ifears v. Insurance Co., 92 Penn. St. 15. But the court will
notice the magnetic variation from the true meridian: Bryan v.
Beckley, 6 Litt. (Ky.) 91. And so of the art of photography, the
mechanical and chemical principles employed, the scientific principles on which they are based, and their results: Lukce v. Calhoun
Co., 52 Ala. 115. And finally, the court will take judicial notice
of the construction and uses of that useful instrument, the ice-cream
freezer: Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37
H. CAMPBELL BLACK.
Williamsport, Pa.
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A., a Massachusetts corporation, and the owner of a patent on a telephone,
licensed B., a Missouri corporation, to do the telephone business of St. Louis,
upon condition that B. should not establish telephonic connection with any telegraph company unless specially authorized by A. A. permitted B. to establish
telephonic connection with the Western Union Telegraph Company. Thereafter the
Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Company applied for a mandamus to compel B. to permit telephonic communication between it and the petitioner.
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party: Held (1), that A. was not a necessary party; (2) that all other telegraph
companies were entitled to the same privilege granted the W. U. Co., upon paying
the same price ; and that the petitioner was entitled to the relief asked. TREAT, J.,
dissenting
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BREWER, J., (Orally)-In this case, I regret to say that my brother
TREAT and myself do not agree fully as to the rights of the parties.
It is an application on the part of the Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph
Company to compel the Bell Telephone Company of Missouri-the
company having the telephone business of this city-to permit telephonic communication between it and the petitioner, the Baltimore
& Ohio Telegraph Company. The defendant answers that it is engaged in the telephonic business here by virtue of a license obtained
from the American Bell Telephone Company, a Massachusetts
corporation; that by the terms of the license under which it does
business, it may not establish telephonic connbction with any
telegraph company, other than that permitted by the licenser-the
holder of the patent-the Massachusetts company; and it further
appears that such licenser has permitted telephonic communication
with the Western Union Telegraph Company.
Now the question is whether the court can compel this defendant,
doing the telephonic business of this city, to establish communication
with any other individual, or company, than that permitted by its
license from the patentee. I believe fully in the sacredness of property ; but I think all property stands upon an equal basis, whether
that property consists of gold dollars in your pocket, real estate, or
the ownership of a patent. There is no peculiar sanctity hovering
over or attaching to the ownership of a patent. It is simply a property right, to be protected as such. Starting from that as a basis,
while every property owner may determine for himself to what he
will devote his property, yet the moment he puts that property into
what I perhaps may, for lack of a better expression, define as the
channels of commerce, that moment he subjects that property to the
laws which control commercial transactions; just as in the warehouse cases (Aunn v. State of Illinois, decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and reported in 94 U. S. 113), it was
held that when an individual built a warehouse, and put his property into that kind of business, he subjected the property thus
placed to the laws which controlled the transactions of commerce, involved in which was the power of the public, through the
legislature, to regulate rates. No man holding property was bound
to build a warehouse, or bound to put his property into that particular channel, but the moment he did so, he put it where the
legislature could say, "You may charge so much, and no more, for
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the transaction of this business." He puts his property into the
channels of commerce-as multitudes are doing-into the railroad
business, into the express business, and into other channels of commerce. Whenever the property is put into those channels, it is
put within the power of the public, speaking through its legislature,
or the power of the court enunciating general rules operative upon
such transactions, to modify leases, modify licenses, control duties.
So, notwithstanding this licenser has given to the licensee the right
to establish a telephonic system in the city of St. Louis, with
telephonic communication with only certain prescribed telegraph
systems, the moment it permitted the establishment of a telephonic
system here, that moment it put such telephonic system within the
control of the state of Missouri, and the control of the courts,
enforcing the obligations of a common carrier.
A telephonic system is simply a system for the transmission of
intelligence and news. It is, perhaps, in a limited sense, and yet
in a strict sense, a common carrier. It must be equal in its dealings with all. It may not say to the lawyers of St. Louis, "my
license is to establish a telephonic system open to the doctors and
the merchants, but shutting out you gentlemen of the bar." The
moment it establishes a telephonic system here, it is bound to deal
equally with all citizens in every department of business; and the
moment it opened its telephonic system to one telegraph company,
that moment it put itself in a position where it was bound to open
its system to any other telegraph company tendering equal pay for
equal service.
So, my conclusion is that, notwithstanding the terms of this
license, which seem to inhibit it from dealing with or giving its telephonic privileges to any other telegraph company than the Western
Union, the moment it established its telephonic system here, that
moment it compelled itself to respond to the demands of any telegraph company or any individual in the city tendering to it equal
pay for equal privileges.
The application for mandamus will be sustained.
TREAT, J.-This is an application, it must be borne in mind,
against the licensee, who has a license only in accordance with the
terms thereof, and we are asked to mandamus that licensee to do
what he has no authority to do under the terms of his license. I
know of no power in a court which can change a contract between

576

B. & 0. TELEGRAPH CO. v. BELL TELEPHONE CO.

the licenser and the licensee, and give him a contract other than
what he has made, either by enlargement or diminution. If this
application had been made against the American Bell Telephone
Company, which holds the patent,-the patentee,-it would have
been a very different question, and the views suggested by my
brother judge would then come up for consideration. But how is
it that this licensee, who has only a restricted privilege, can by a
mandamus of this court be ordered to do what under his contracts
he cannot do? Can we make a new contract? Now, so far as the
American Bell Telephone Company is concerned, which holds the
patent, it reserved for itself the right with respect to telegraphic
connections; and it is alleged in this petition that it has granted
that to one company. Now, if the American Bell Telephone
Company was here, as between it and this party petitioner, the
question presented by my brother judge would have arisen, and in
that, possibly, we might not have differed at all.
This matter is not a new one in the courts. In the noted case in
Ohio the court proceeded not as in this case, because .there were two
parties defendant or respondents, to wit: the American Bell Telephone Company, that had all these rights, with which it had not
parted ; also the local company, and the charter of the state in connection therewith. There is no such case here. A like case to this
was reviewed very elaborately by the Connecticut Supreme Court
(I think in 49 Conn.),1 where precisely the views I am expressing
were entertained, and they seemed to me a demonstration, and
express much more clearly and forcibly than I can do in this summary manner, the true doctrine arising out of the sanctity of contracts. If this party wishes the American Bell Telephone Company
to grant equal privileges to it with another telegraph company, let
it pursue it-make it do what it is asked-but I cannot see, by any
true theory of the law, why this local party is to have its rights
enlarged, and its duties correspondingly enlarged, in violation of the
contract under which it rests.
There may be many reasons, of course, no judicial notice of them
being taken, why this restriction was made, to wit: Here is a telephonic system in St. Louis. Each one of you present here may
wish, under the terms stated, to have such telephonic connection.
It is stated in the license, which is a contract, that no one of you
I American Rapid Telegraph Co. v. Connecticut Telephone Co., 49 Conn. 352.
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shall use that for the purposes of taking tolls thereon. In other
words, if I have a telephonic connection in my house, and I pay
whatever the figure is for it, I am not to open a general telephonic
system there, and let the whole neighborhood come in and use my
telephone, and pay me therefor, and thus destroy the telephone
company's income. "It is a personal right, restricted to the use
of the. individual and his immediate needs. When you bring a
telegraph company into operation in connection with it, what would
happen? At the telegraph stations here probably there are
thousands of messages coming in every day. It is receiving for
these telegrams a given amount of money, and taking its tolls
thereon. Further than that, instead of doing as heretofore,
employing its messengers to do this work, we are asked to compel
this telephone company to do that messenger work for it, as an
individual would do in permitting his telephone to be used 400 to
500 times a day-it may be for general purposes-and the whole
telegraphic business of the country poured on this telephonic
system and done at a low figure. That, I suppose, was one of the
reasons why this restriction was put there.
But suffice it to say, in my judgment there is no authority for
courts to compel a man to do what he has no right to do, and force
him to violate his contract. He stands on his contract as he has
made it, and there end his duties, obligations and rights, and courts
cannot cause him to violate it. That is my view of the case. Parties must pursue the American Bell Telephone Company if they
wish this question to be presented. It cannot arise in this way.
BREWER, J.-I
may be pardoned for suggesting, and I do it
with great deference, because as you all know I share with all the
members of the bar in this district in a profound admiration for my
brother TREAT, that there are two things which seem to me to make
against his argument very strongly. I agree with him that if this
telephonic system had refused a telephonic connection with any
telegraph company, that the Baltimore & Ohio Telegraph Company
could not in sist upon such connection, but when it has established
a telephonic connection with one telegraph company, I think,
every other telegraph company has equal right; on the same principle that if it established a telephonic connection with one lawyer,
it could not refuse telephonic connection with another lawyer; and
the further practical question, that while there may be a contract
VOL. XXXrII.-73
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between the licenser and th'e licensee, the licenser is not a citizenan inhabitant-of or found within this district. Suppose this petitioner went to Massachusetts, and obtained a decree there binding
the licenser; that would not bind the licensee; that would not disturb the contract, so far as the licensee is concerned. Would the
court in Massachusetts have entertained a suit seeking to establish
a naked legal right, and without practical benefit to any one? The
licensee does not live in Massachusetts. The licenser does not live
in St. Louis. Practically, of what avail would a decree be against
a licenser in Massachusetts ? Would it bind the licensee here ?
Haven't you got, in a last resort-a last analysis for practical results-to come right to the licenser, the holder, the proprietor of
the telephonic system here ?
TREAT, J.-You omit one consideration (and I may say we are
not going into a discussion of the question on the bench,) but it so
happens that the licenser, by the very terms of his license, is the
only party to make connection. He has done it, and the licensee
has nothing to do with it. If you compel the licenser, in whom
alone is reserved'this privilege, to equalize the matter, he does it;
it is immaterial whether the licensee agrees with whatever the
licenser says shall be done. Hence the licensee wouldn't be a
necessary party anywhere.
GENERAL RULE OF EQUALITY AND
REASONABLENESs.-The questions under
discussion in the foregoing case have already been considered by some courts.
In Am. Union Tel. Co. v. Bell Telephone
Co., 10 Cent. L. J. 438, the telegraph
company applied to the telephone company for an instrument to be placed in
its office. The telephone company refused, and- a mandamus was asked and
granted, compelling it to do so. Judge
THAYER said: "The principles of law
applicable to railroad companies and to
other common carriers unquestionably apply to telegraph and telephone companies.
Having established their lines and adopted
a uniform mode of serving the public,
consistent with their chartered powers,
they must treat all persons similarly situated with respect to those lines alike,
and without unjust discrimination. It is

not fbr them to select whom they will
serve, or impose conditions of service on
one class of customers that do not apply
equally to all persons occupying the same
relative positions toward the company.
* * * if it erects its main line along
a certain street or streets, under a power
granted in its charter to use public highways for that purpose, and under a charter
granting it the power to condemn land
for the construction of a telephone line,
and if it elects to serve the public by furnishing instruments to residents along
such line for private use, and by making
connections between such instruments
and its main lines: above all, if it holds
itself out to the public as prepared to
furnish such instruments, and make such
connections for all who may apply, then
I should say that its duty to the public
compels it to treat all residents along such
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line, with absolute impartiality. It can-- Louisville Tran.fer Co. v. Am. District
not grant such facilities or render such Tel. Co., 24 Al. L. J. 283.
service to one citizen or corporation, and
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has
refuse like pi:ivileges to his next door rendered a similar decision in State v.
neighbor. * * * It follows, from the NVebraska Telephone Co., 24 Am. L. Reg.
principles above stated, that in refusing 263. Respondent was the owner of,and
to grant to the relator, such facilities as conducted a system of public telephone
it affords to other customers, it has vio- exchanges in Nebraska and Iowa, inlAted an imperative duty imposed upon it eluding in its circuit about 1500 teleby law." See also, 11 Cent. L. J. 359 phone instruments, supplied by it to that
(St. Louis Circuit Court).
number of subscribers, upon the terms
The same point came before the Ken- fixed by itself. Relator applied to be
tucky court sitting in chancery. Plain- admitted as a subscriber, and was refused.
tiffs were proprietors of public carriages, He tendered a full compliance with all
and defendants were a telephone com- the rules of the company. His place of
pany that was also a proprietor of pub- business was accessible, no reason being
lic carriages.
The court said: "The
shown why his request should not be
real contention between plaintiffs and granted. On an application for a mandefendants is confined to their carriage damus, held, that the telephone is a
services ; the defendants insisting that public servant in the commerce of the
against the plaintiffs, rivals in that busi- country, and that respondent, having
ness, they have a right to a monopoly in undertaken to supply the demand must
the use of their own telephonic methods supply to all alike,without discrimination,
of communicating and receiving orders and that having to supply the demand in
for carriages ; that a mere rival in one the city of Lincoln, wherein-the relator
branch of their business, cannot force resided, and being fully able to furnish
them to afford him the facilities which him with a telephone instrument, the
they have provided for another branch same as its other subscribers, it was its
of their business. Upon the facts. ap- duty to do so. And so also, has decided
pearing upon the petition and affidavits the Supreme Court of Ohio: State v. Bell
of the plaintiffs, it is the opinion of the Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296.
court that the defendants are engaged in
Similar conclusions have been reached
two distinct employments-one operating
by courts with reference to a board of
a telephonic exchange, and the other trade, and its duty to its quotations of
operating a carriage service. They are prices to the public without unjust disnot rivals in the former business, and as crimination. Thus in Public Grain and
to that part of the defendant's business Stock Exchange v. W. U. Tel. Co., 16
they occupy the same position towards Fed. Rep. 289, TULEY, Chancellor,
the plaintiffs as they do towards the rest speaking of the exchange or board of
of the public. The defendants are a trade said : "It may be true that neither
quasi public servant, and as such are the courts nor the legislature can interfere
bound to serve the general public, includ- with its control of its own floor, or with
ing the plaintiffs, on reasonable terms, the right of the board to discipline its
with impartiality. They are. governed members. But I am clearly of opinion
by the principles of the law of common that the business transacted upon the floor
carriers. * * * The principles an- of the board of trade is ' affected with a
nounced in an opinion by Judge THAYER,
public interest' to an extent which would
in Am. Union Tel. Co. v. Bell Telephone authorize the legislature, and the courts
Co., should determine this controversy :" in the absence of legislation, to prohibit
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the board of trade exercising any discrimination as to who shall receive from
the telegraph companies these market
quotations, or as to what telegraph companies shall be allowed facilities for distributing the information to the public.
It is opposed to the very spirit of its
charter that it become monopoly, or a
corporation." But see Bryant v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 825 ; Bradley
v. W. U. Tel. Co., Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, April 8th 1883 ; cited 17
Fed. Rep. 834.
So also with reference to gas companies. Perhaps the best case affirming
the duty of a gas company to serve all
alike is Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas-Light
Co., 6 Wi . 547. In this decision the
duty is grounded upon the fact that a gas
company is a practical monopoly, and as
such, bound to serve alike all who are
similarly situated, and who desire gas. It
was even intimated in this last case, that
dealers in groceries or other commodities,
might be under a similar duty toward the
public. "But suppose," said the court,
"the citizen was prohibited from obtaining soap, candies, or carriages from any
other than the particular corporation, how
would the case stand ? Could such company wantonly refuse to sell to the citizen upon the usual terms ?" Shepard v.
Milwaukee G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 547. That
a gas company must serve all who desire
gas, see also, N. 0. G. L. t- B. Co. N.
Pauldinq, 12 Rob. (La.) 378; G. L.
Co. v. Colliday, 25 Md. 1 : People v.
Afanhatton G. Co., 45 Barb. 136 ; Bedding v. Inperial G. Co., 7 Gas Jour.
418 ; Pennyv. Rossendale U. G. Co., 14
Id. 937.
The duty of railway, express, and
telegraph companies to serve the public
without unreasonable discrimination,
either in prices or facilities, has been so
often and so peremptorily affirmed by
courts of the highest authority that as a
principle, its acceptance is at least professed by most managers of those companies, however short of living up to its

full meaning, they may come in the actual
transaction of their business. As sustaining the application to these companies
of the principle of reasonableness and
equality, reference may however be
made to the following decisions: McDarfee v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 447 : .
E. Ex. Co. v. M. C. Rd. Co., 57 Me.
194 ; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481 ;
Sanford v. Railroad Co., 24 Penn. ;t.
378; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113:
Winona, 4-c., ,d. Co. v. Blake, Id. I so;
N. J. Nay. Co. v. -Merchants' Bank, 6
How. 382 ; Vincent v. C. 4- A. Rd. Co., 49
Ill. 33; C. -. T. Rd. Co. v. People, 56
Id. 365 ; C. 4 . A. Rd. Co. v. People, 67
Id. 22 ; People v. A. 4- V. Rd. Co., 24
N. Y. 269 ; Southern Express Co. v. Iron
Mountain Rd. Co., 3 McCrary 147;
Southern Ex. Co. v. LouiserilleJ.Nashville
Rd.Co., 20 Am. L. R.(N. S.) 590 ; State
v. H. 6-N. H. Rd. Co., 29 Conn. 538.
The conclusions deduced by the writer
from a study of the foregoing and other
similar adjudications may be stated as
follows: A corporation may by its charter
or some statute, be made a public company. Public corporations must, because
they are public, serve the public without
unreasonable discrimination, either in
prices or facilities.
While the fact that a public corporation
is public, obligates it to deal equally by
all, yet this fact is not the only reason,
if indeed it be a reason at all, for imposing a similar duty upon boards of trade,
telephone, railway, telegraph, gas, water,
or other such companies.
Ordinarily
such companies are private, not public
corporations, and their duties to the people result, not from their status as public
or private corporations, but from the nature of the business they are engaged in.
That business, whether it consist in
supplying transportation, communication,
gas, water, quotations of prices or anything else, is serving the public, and
when any one even a private person, undertakes to serve the public, he or it
must render the service, whatever it may
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be, impartially for all, and without undue
preference or unjust prejudice towards
any. It is the fact that the service is
for the publi, and not the legal status
of the servant that determines the rule
of law that governs its performance.
Especially will the rule'of equality and
reasonableness, be applied where the servant has a legal or practical monopoly of
the services offered. It is probable that
complaint of discrimination will arise
only where a monopoly exists, for so long
as there is competition, buyers unable to
make satisfactory contracts with one
dealer, may readily do so with another.
But even where competition exists, it may
be doubted whether a public dealer in
any commodity may wantonly, unreasonably and injuriously prefer one customer to another.
COXFLICTING CAsEs.-While the
weight of authority is believed by the
writer to sustain these conclusions, it is
not to be understood if the cases sustain
them. Many courts decided differently.
Thus with reference to gas companies,
Judge BIGELOW says " No public duty is
imposed upon them, nor are they charged
with any public trust. They are authorized to make and distribute gas for their
own profit and gain only. They are
not bound to sell and dispose o' it to any
one, either for public or private use or
consumption. It is entirely at their own
option, whether they will exercise their
corporate rights and privileges at all ;
and if they undertake to manufacture and
dispose of gas, the extent to which they
shall carry on their business, is left to
their own election. Nor is any power
conferred upon them to take private property not previously appropriated to a
public use, for tbe purpose of exercising
and enjoying their franchise. The only
right and privilege given to them, is to
dig up public streets and ways for the
purpose of laying down their mains and
pipes:" Commonwealth v. Lowell G. L.
Co., 12 Allen 75.
So, also, with reference to telephones;
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in American Rapid Telegraph Co. v. Connecticut Telephone Co., 49 Conn. 352,
wherein the Connecticut Telephone Company, organized as a joint-stock corporation under the general law of Connecticut
for the purpose of constructing and using
within the state mechanism for telephonic
communication, purchased from the Bell
Telephone Company, a Massachusetts
corporation, which owned a patent for a
telephone, a license for a term of years,
to use its device within a certain district
in Connecticut; the contract containing
a provision, that no telegraph company,
without the consent of the licensors, (who
designated one company for the purpose),
should be allowed through it, to collect
and deliver messages from and to its customers. Another telegraph company
which had a station in the district, having
demanded of the Connecticut corporation
the same benefit with the other company,
with an offer of payment, and been refused, applied for a mandamus to compel
the corporation to grant the benefit.
Held, in refusing the application, that
the Massachusetts corporation, owning the
patent had a right in granting licenses for
its use to impose whatever restrictions it
chose ; that the Connecticut corporation
therefore acquired a right only to the restricted use of the patented device, and
its duty to the public, did not extend
beyond that restricted use ; that the statute (Session Laws of 1879, cb. 36,
amending Gen. Statutes, p. 342, sect. 8)
requiring all telegraph and telephone companies to receive dispatches from all other
telegraph and telephone lines, and transmit them on payment of the usual charge,
could not operate to compel the Connecticut corporation to do what it had no
right to do ; that a Massachusetts statute
to the same effect was to be regarded as
applying to the action of the Massachusetts corporation as a carrier of speech in
that state, and as not affecting its right
to manufacture its instruments or sell or
lease them in other states as the owner of
the patent.
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With reference to this case and the
opinion of Judge TREAT in the principal
case, this may be said : If the decisions
that a telephone, telegraph, railway or
other sucfi company cannot discriminate
in-serving the public are sound, then the
provision in the contract of the Bell
Telephone Company with its licensees,
that they shall furnish instruments only
to such companies as may be designated
by the licensors, is an unlawful stipulation. It is, therefore, no contract at all,
so far at least as this provision is concerned. The licensees being governed
in the distribution of their instruments
by no provision whatever, or, what is
the same thing in law, by a null and
void provision, would be at liberty to
furnish them to whomever they pleased,
and of course indiscriminately. Such
being their contract relation with their
licensors, compelling them by mandamus
to serve all the public alike, would not
as suggested by Judge TREAT, be making
a new contract for the parties. It would
simply be enforcing their duties to the
public in a matter not covered by any
contract which the law could recognise.
Still, as has been already intimated,
there is considerable conflict of authority
concerning the public duties of these
companies. See, with reference to boards
of trade and their duty to furnish the
public with quotations of prices, Bryant
v. W. . Tel. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 825.
As to gas companies, see further McCune
v. Norwich City G. Co., 30 Conn. 521;
Commonwealth v. Gas L. Co., 12 Allen
75; Patrson G. L. Co. v. Brady, 27
N. J. L. 245; Pudsey Coal G. Co. v.
Coiorationof Bradford, L. R., 15 Eq.
167 ; Houlgate v. Surrey Consumers G.
Co., 8 Gas Jour. 261 ; Roddesdon G. 4C. Co. v. Raselwood, 6 0. B. (N. S.)
238; 8 Gas Jour. 261 ; Com. Bank of
Canadav. London G. Co., 20 U. C., Q.
B. 233.
PRICE REGULATIONS.

1. By the State or Municpalty.-It is
the undoubted right of the legislature to

regulate the price of whatever may be
sold by a public servant to the people.
A strong case upon this point is Spring
Valley Waterworks Co. v. Bartlett. The
Spring ValleyWaterworks was organized
under a statute providing that the price
of the water furnished to San Francisco
and its citizens should be fixed annually
by two persons appointed by the city,
two by the corporation, and one to be
chosen by the other four, and in case they
could not agree, by the sheriff of the
county. Art. 14, of the California constitution, subsequently adopted, changed
this mode without the consent of the
company, and provided that the price of
the water should be fixed annually by the
board of supervisors of the city and
county alone, giving the company no
voice in the matter : Held, that such
change was not void on the ground of taking private property for public or private
use without compensation or without due
process of law as conferring the sole
power to fix the price upon the purchaser
nor as impairing the obligation of a contract: Held, also that the fact that candidates for the office of supervisor pledged
themselves to the people to fix prices,
&c., in accordance with the requirements
of the resolutions of a public meeting
nominating them before election, did
not disqualify the supervisors elected
upon such pledges from acting in fixing
the price of water: SpringValley Waterworks v. Bartlett (California 1883, U. S.
Circuit Court), 2 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 94. See also Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 2 Am. & Eng. Corp.
Cas. 122.
2. By the Company.-The company
supplying the gas, water, communication,
etc., may itself make reasonable charges
therefor; Parkerv. Boston, I Allen 361 ;
Cromwell v. Stephens, 3 Ab. Pr. (N. S.)
26; Allentown Y. Henry, 73 Penn. St.
404. But a city or water company cannot make unwarranted discriminations in
pirticular cases or arbitrary charges
with the penalty of forfeiture of the
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right to use the water provided for the
benefit of all the citizens, making a fair
compensation for its use: State v. Mfayor,
4c., of Jersey City, 46 IN. J. L. 297;
Dayton v. Quigley, 2 Stew. Eq. 77 ; Parker v. City of Boston, 1 Allen 361;
Young v. City of Boston, 104 Mass.
95 ; Kip v. Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298.
There are two ways in which waterrents may be rated and collected, one by
meter, and the other by house-rates and
estimates. A city or water company
may adopt either, but it cannot put"into
a house an expensive meter-costing say
$200-and compel the house owner or
occupant to pay the price of it in addition
to his regular water-hills, and it would
appear from this case that water charges
should be fixed primarily with a view to
paying expenses of operating and maintaining the water system, and interest or
dividends on the capital invested, together
with the principal, if the water system be
the property of the city ; State v. 11fayor,
4-c., of Jersey City, 46 N. J. L. 297.
Water rents assessed on vacant lots at
rates adopted by the hoard of works at its
discretion and without regard to special
benefits or valuations are illegal: Jersey
City v. Vreeland, 14 Vroom 638 ; Provident Ins. for Savings v. Allen, 37 N. J.
Eq. 36 ; State v. Mayor, 45 N. J. L.
256. And laches is not a bar, on certiorari to set aside such rents as having
been assessed in an unconstitutional manner.

Water supplied for "domestic" use
may be used without incurring liability
for extra charge, for washing a horse and
carriage, &c-, in a coach-house and stable on the premises of the rate payer's
residence: Busby v. Chesterfield Co., E.,
B. & E. 176.
A building in New York was a large
structure of eight stories, each story composed of lodging rooms adapted to the
use of one person only. Above the basement it was used exclusively as a lodging
house.
The rooms were small, from
four to six feet wide and eight feet long,
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and were let to lodgers at a fixed rate
per night. There were no arrangements
for boarding or cooking for guests, thd
place being adapted above the basement
only for lodgings. Nor was there any bar
or restaurant belonging to or connected
with plaintiff's occupation of the building. Held, that this structure was not
chargeable for water as a "hotel;"
Cromwell v. Stephens, 3 Ab. Pr. (N. S.)
26.
A person occupying, with his family a
suite of rooms in a building also occupied by other families, and having separate water attachments connected with a
pipe which supplied the whole building,
and on which pipe a meter was fixed, can
by injunction, restrain the company from
cutting off his supply, because he insists
upon paying for the water used by himself, rather than have the owner of the
building (also objecting) pay for the
water used by all the tenants, and then
attempt to subdivide the sum paid by the
owner among the various tenants:
Young v. Boston, 104 Mass. 95.
Security in the shape of a deposit of
money or otherwise, may be required of
a consumer, as a guaranty of the payment of his regular rates: Shepard v.
Milwaukee Gas Co., 6 Wis. 549. The
company may demand an increase of the
deposit where that given is insufficient to
protect his large and increasing consumption bills: Fordv. Brooklyn G. L. Co.,
10 N. Y. Supreme Ct. 621. When the
deposit is refunded to the consumer, the
company may cut off the gas: Littlewood
v. Equitable Gas Co., 8 Gas J. 541.
But see Sprattv. South Met. Gas Co., 7
Gas J. 663 (1858), deciding that where
the company's charter gave them no authority to demand'a deposit, theyhad no
right to require one as a condition to supplying gas, and in lVestlake v. St. Louis,
77 Mo, 47, it was held that payment of
a water license under threat of turning
off the water in case of continued refusal,
is payment under compulsion, and if the
charge is excessive, the excess may be
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recovered without tendering the amount
really due. The deposit demanded must
however, be reasonable in amount; if it
be unreasonable-e. g., 21. asked, where
11. would have been sufficient-it maybe
compelled to furnish its gas or water on
payment of the reasonable deposit:
Samuel v. Cordfl G. Co., 18 Gas J.
192.
In an action for damages for refusal to
supply plaintiff with gas, it appeared
that plaintiff made a deposit of 21. 10s.,
as requested, that at the end of the next
quarter, a bill was rendered to him by
the gas company, of l. 19s. 6d. ; that
in June following, the plaintiff was notified that unless he paid the bill at once,
the gas would be cut off by the company;
that he refused payment on the ground
that the deposit more than covered the
amount of the bill, and on June 18th the
gas was cut off, and the company sent
him a bill for 31. 14s. 6d., minus the
deposit of 21. 1Os. ; that the plaintiff was
thereupon summoned before the magis,
trate, and compelled topay 19s. 6d., a
charge of 5s. for cutting off the gas
being disallowed, and that afterwards the
plaintiff requested the company to resume
the supply, which they refused to do, unless he paid the expense of putting it on
again; Held, that the cutting off was
illegal, and the company was liable for
damages: Halfhive v. Worthing Gas
Co., 22 Gas J. 136.
In a suit for damages for the refusal
of a gas company to supply him with
gas, the court said there were "three
grounds of defence alleged, viz. : 1st,
That the plaintiff was a joint contributor
and that this was a partnership debt;
.2d, That on entering the premises he did
not give notice to the defendants; 3d,
That the company was not bound to
furnish a supply of gas, but on all
of these points the opinion was in favor
of the plaintiff, and that a gas comupany
had no right to deprive a tenant of his
supply because of a disputed debt which
he had expressed his willingness to pay

if a court of law should decide he was
liable :" Penny v. .Rosendale U. G. Co.,
14 Gas J. 927.
Where the security taken by the company was a demand note signed by
plaintiff, on which payment was immediately demanded and the gas shut off
because plaintiff requested a short delay
in payment: Held, that the security for
the payment of the gas bills still existed,
and that the refusal of the company to
supply gas was not authorized by the
statute: Fowler v.CJ'arteredGas Co., 17
Gas J. 908.
Inability to pay, or non-payment of
current bills for consumption, warrants
the company in shutting off the water or
gas: People v. Manhattan G. L. Co., 45
Barb. 136 ; Morey v. Metropolitan G. L.
Co., 38 N. Y. Superior Ct. 185.
Furnishing an applicant for gas without objecting to his non-payment 'of
bills, will not estop a company from
refusing to supply him upon a subsequent
application on the ground that his former
bills are unpaid : People v. Manhattan
G. L. Co., 45 Barb, 136.
But the non-payment relied upon to
justify the shutting off of water or gas
must be that of the person whose water
is shut off. Non-payment by his tenant,
his landlord, or by some other person
with whose liability he is in no way a
privy, will not suffice. See Dayton v.
Quigley, 29 N. J. Eq. 77.
A gas company cannot require the
owner of a building to pay an amount
due by a former owner for gas, as the
condition of supplying him: N. 0. G.
L. J"B. Co. v. Paulding, 12 Rob. (La.)
378; Morey v. Metropolitan G. L. Co.,
38 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 185. And a promise
by the owner of a building to pay an
amount'due by a former owner for gas,
made in order to obtain gas for his own
benefit, and in consequence of a threat
by the company having the exclusive
privilege of vending gas that unless the
amount be paid no gas would be furnished, is void: N. 0. G. L. 4- B. Co.
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v. Paulding, 12 Rob. (La.) 378. And
where a company, having the right to
cut off water from any consumer on failure to pay in advance, notified all of them
that after March Ist the rates would be
advanced from $10 to $12, and on March
1st P. tendered $10 for the ensuing year,
which the company refused to receive,
but allowed the water to run upon P.'s
premises for the next two years: FNeld,
that it could only recover $20, because it
might have stopped the supply March 1st:
Aqueduct v Page, 52 N. H. 472.
So where several contracts arc made
between the same parties, for different
pieces of property, each requiring its own
meter. a failure to comply with terms
in rtintion to one, furnishes no excuse
or ground to the company to withhold
the gas from the other: G. L. Co. v.
Colliday, 25 Md. 3.
Applicatiou.-A company may require
its consumers to make a written application for a supply of gas, water, &c.
But where a gas company has a right to
insist that a customer shall make an application in writing for a supply of gas
in a certain form but upon an oral application, refuses to supply him with gas,
giving a different reason for such refusal,
it therehy waives its right to such written application, and the fact that such
application was oral, is no defence to an
action for refusing to supply: Shephard
v. Milwaukea G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 539.
The company may also require applicants
to sign its reasonable regulations: Shepardv. .3filwaukee G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 546.
Inspection.-The company may reserve
to itself the right to inspect meters, &c.,
at stated periods and with notice, but it
cannot reserve the right to do so at all
times and without notice : Shepard v.
Milwaukee G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 549.
Fraud on Company, Connecting Pipes,
4-c., Unreasonable Regulations.-A regulation that after the admission of gas
into a person's fittings, they must not be
disconnected or opened, either for alteration or repairs or extensions without a
VOL. X XII.-74
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permit from the company, which may be
obtained at their office free of expense ;
and that any gas-fitter or other person
who may violate this regulation will be
held liable to pay treble the amount of
damages occasioned thereby is illegal and
void: Shepard v. Milwaukee G. L. Co.,
6 Wis. 549.
A gas company may reserve the right
at any time to cut off communication of
the service, if it be necessary so to do.to
protect the works against abuse or fraud,
but cannot assume to itself the whole
power to decide upon the question of
abuse or fraud, either in fact o in anticipation, without notice, without trial, and
of its own mere notion. It must resort
to the same tribunals upon like process,
for protection against fraud, as the law
provides for individuals: ,Shepard v.
Mil. G. L. Co., 6 Wis. 549.
Supplying the Pt~blic with Water-Public use.-A town was presented with an
ornamental fountain, provided with a
trough or basin, which was set up in one
of the public streets, and supplied with
water on public market days jor the use
of cattle in the market, and for horses if
yolked when passing to and fro: Held,
that even if the fountain were a pulilie
nuisance, an inhabitant of the town would
have no right to use it otherwise than as
directed, for example, he would have no
right in order to save the expense of
water at his stables, to bring his horses to
the basin to drink : Eildreth v. Adamson,
8 C. B. (N. S.) 587. All persons of
the public must, howe7er, be supplied
equally. A supply cannot be given to
one of a class, and denied to others,
In Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. 62,
Chief Justice SirAw speaking of the suggestion made as to the charter of a water
company that there being no express provision therein requiring the corporation
to supply all families and persons who
should apply for water, on reasonable
terms, the company may act capriciously
and oppressively; and that by furnishing
some houses and lots and refusing
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a supply to others, it may thus give
a value to some lots and deny it to
others, said: "This would be a plain
abuse 'of their franchise. By accepting
the-act of incorporation they undertake
to do all the public duties required by it.
When an individual or a corporation is
guilty of a breach of public duty, by
misfeasance or non-f easance, and the law
has provided no other specific punishment
for the breach, an indictment will lie.

Perhaps also in a suitable case a process
to revoke and annul the franchise might
be maintained :" Luambard v. Stearns, 4
Cush. 62. Failure to supply the public
without unreasonable delay may make
the company liable in damages, or to a
penalty provided by statute : Bedding v.
Imperial Gaslight Co., 7 Gas J. 814 ;
Commercial Gas Co. v. Scott, L. R., 10
Q. B. 400.
ADEILBERT HAMILTON.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
GRIFFITH, ADMINISTRATOR, v. THE CHARLOTTE, COLUMBIA AND

AUGUSTA' RAILROAD COMPANY.
An administrator has no such property in the body of a decedent as will enable
him to recover damages for its mutilation through the negligence of a railroad.
Semble: He may, however, recover damages in such case for the destruction
of the apparel on such body.

APPEAL from Circuit Court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIMPSON, C.J.-This action was brought by the plaintiff, appellant, as administrator of W. Scott Hook, deceased, to recover
damages for the mutilation of the dead body of the intestate, and

the destruction of the apparel in which it was clad, and of a silver
watch at the time on the person of the deceased; all of which is

alleged to have occurred by the gross negligence of the defendant
-company in running a train of cars over said dead body three
-several times. The defence denied negligence and claimed that the
.complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The whole issue was by consent referred to a special referee, to
:hear and determine the same.

The referee found as matter of law that the action by the
administrator could be sustained. As matter of fact, that the
mutilation of the dead body, and the destruction of the wearing
apparel resulted from the careless and negligent action of the
defendant, and that the amount of the recovery was not limited to
the value* of the clothing, $30, and he found for the plaintiff
,610,000 damages.

The decision of the referee was reversed by his honor, Judge
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upon exceptions, who finding that the alleged negligence
by defendant had not been proved, and that the plaintiff could not
maintain tfie action, as administrator, because he had no property
in the dead body of his intestate, dismissed the complaint. The
plaintiff appealed.
(Here follows a discussion of certain questions of procedure
which is omitted as not of general interest.)
Apart from' the question of procedure, the appellant contends
that there is such property or interest in the dead body of a human
being as to sustain an action for its wilful or negligent mutilation,
and that the right of action in such cases belongs to the administrator of the deceased.
This proposition raises three questions as applicable to the case
at bar. 1st. What is meant by the term property ? 2d. Can this
property attach to the dead body of a human being? And 3d. If
so, does it belong to the administrator?
The term "property" may be defined to be, the interest which
can be acquired in external objects or things. The things themselves are not in a true sense property, but they constitute its
foundation and material, and the idea of property springs out
of the connection, or control, or interest which according to law
may be acquired in them, or over them.
This interest may be absolute, or it may be limited and qualified.
It is absolute when a thing is objectively and lawfully appropriated
by one to his own use, in exclusion of all others. It is limited or
qualified when the control acquired falls short of the absolute, which
may be the case sometimes for several -reasons not necessary to be
adverted to here.
Now to entitle one to bring action for an injury to any specific
object or thing, he must have a property therein, of the one kind
or the other mentioned. If he has no such property, he can have
no cause of action, however flagrant or reprehensible the act complained of may be.
Can property either absolute or qualified be acquired in a corpse,
and especially as involved in the case under investigation can such
property be acquired by the administrator of the deceased ?
As to absolute property, Mr. Blackstone says: "Though the
heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his
ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes:" 2 Blackst.
Com. 429. In Jacobs's Digest, it is said: "A dead body by law
ALDRICH,
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belongs to no one, and is therefore under the protection of the
public."
Mr. Bishop said: "There can be no property in a person deceased, consequently larceny cannot be committed of his body, but
it can be of the clothes found upon the body, or of the shroud :"
Bishop Crim. Law 792, citing East P. 0. 652; Hawkins and Hale
P.O.
Mr. Wharton says: Corpu humanum non recepit estimationem:'
Wharton 228. Lord CoiKE said: The "burial of the cadover
nullius in boni.- Carodatavermitis: Flesh given to the worms."
Mr. Blackstone said again : "That is the case of stealing a
shroud out of the grave which is the property of those whoever they
may be, that buried the deceased, but stealing the corpse itself,
which has no owner (though a great indecency) is no felony unless
some grave clothes be stolen with it: 4 Blackstone Com. 235.
These are strong expressions from leading and distinguished authors all tersely conveying the same doctrine and concurring to the
full. We have been referred to no case by appellant, in conflict
with this doctrine, nor have we been able ourselves to find a case,
or a single expression in any text-book, which affects it in the
slightest degree. And that this should be so, is not surprising.
Because while it is natural, that we should all feel that the remains
of ancestors, and of loved ones should be tenderly watched, and
their decent interment carefully guarded, and the mutilation of their
dead bodies, and the disturbance of their sepulchre severely punished, and while all laws necessay to that end should be'passed,
and strictly and sternly enforced, yet even for this purpose, to make
such venerated remains the absolute property of any one, in the
sense of objective appropriation, would be abhorrent to every impulse and feeling of our natures.
It is true, it is said, that in some portions of Europe during the middle ages, the law allowed a creditor to seize the dead body of his
debtor, and in ancient Egypt the corpse of the father might be
hypothecated by the son, in order to borrow money. But these
were in barbarous and heathenish times, and such ideas have no
existence now in any portion of the globe. On the contrary,
wherever civilization at least dawned or has commenced to throw
even a flickering light upon the people, reverence for the dead has
become a universal and a most sacred sentiment; one which would
revolt at the idea of thdir remains becoming property, much less
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property in the sense of being appraised and placed upon the inventory of the administrator, subject to the payment of debts and
to distribution among the next of kin, which would be required by
the law of this state, if such remains could be regarded as property
and on that account passing to the administrator. But can there
not be a qualified properiy in the dead, one which gives control to
some one with the view to protection, to decent interment, and to
undisturbed repose, while they are dissolving and returning to the
dust from which they were created ? Can it be that there is no legal
guardianship of the dead ? And that when the life escapes, the
body is left, so far as the law is concerned, without protection, even
from wanton and malicious depredation, and that those to whom it
was bound, in life by the tenderest of ties, can invoke the aid of
no court in preventing its mutilation, and must they resort to violence
and force for this purpose ? If such be the fact, it is a reproach to
our judicial system, and one which calls earnestly for legislative
interposition.
And yet such seems to be the fact, at least the matter is left in
great doubt, so far as our limited examination of the cases both in
this country and in England, amid the press of our duties, has enabled us to ascertain. Certainly the administrator has no legal control
or authority over the dead body of the person upon whose estate
he has administered. His entire authority is derived from the act,
by virtue of which his letters have been granted to him, and that
gives him charge only of the "goods and chattels, rights and
credits," which were of the deceased. The body of the intestate
belongs to neither of these classes, and there is, therefore, no law
for him to take it in charge. True he is required to pay as the first
of debts, the funeral expenses, but it would be a violent assumption
to conclude on that account, that he becomes the legal custodian
of the remains, or even if he should, it could only be so, as to the
funeral and burial, because the expenses extend no further, they
stop at the grave. The question would then arise who could legally
protect beyond that point, and in whose behalf could the law be
invoked to redress an invasion of the tomb.
We have looked diligently through the common law reports of
England and have found no case, in which the civil courts have
been appealed to in matters connected with the bodies df the dead.
On the contrary, their burial, the grave-yards and cemeteries in
which they are interred and the religious ceremonies observed have
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been left exclusively to ecclesiastical cognisance ; the civil courts
universally holding, in the language of Lord COKE, "that the burial
of the cadover is nullius in lonis." In some of the states upon
this continent, especially in Rhode Island, in Pennsylvania, and
New York, the courts, endeavoring to escape from this reproach,
have held in general terms that the corpse belongs, not to the administrator but to the next of kin, and that is as far as the cases
referred to by appellant's counsel seem to go. In the case of Pierce
v. The Swan Point Cemetery Co., 10 R. L 227, it was held that
while a dead body is not property in the strict sense of the common
law, it is quasi property over which the relativeA of the deceased
have rights which the courts will protect.
In the case of In re Widening Beekman Street, 4 Bradf. 503,
it was held, that the right to bury the corpse and to preserve its
remains is a legal right which the courts will protect. That such
right, in the absence of any testamentary disposition, belongs exclusively to the next of kin." In Bogert v. City of Indianapolis,
13 Ind. 135, it was held, that the bodies of the dead belong to the
surviving relations in the-order of inheritance, as property. In
Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Penn. St. 293, it was held that a
wife has no right or control over the body of her husband, deceased,
after burial. The disposition of the remains of the deceased
belongs thereafter exclusively to his next of kin;" that though
it was her duty to bury the body, as widow after interment her
Upon what authority or established principle of
right ended.
the common law these decisions were founded, even to the extent
of legalizing the right of the nearest of kin, does not fully appear,
but they afford no support to the position that the administrator
has any control whatever, which is the question here. We have
no case in our own reports upon the subject, certainly no case
bearing upon the precise point before us, i. e. the rights of the
administrator. In the absence of all authority, and looking at the
act, which authorizes administration, and defines the duties and
powers of administrators and describes the property which by operation of law becomes his, we are constrained to the conclusion,
that so far as this action is founded upon the mutilation of the
deceased by the defendant company, whether accidental, wilful, or
negligent, it cannot be sustained by the plaintiff, and that his honor,
the circuit judge was correct in so holding.
This, however, does not apply to the clothes in which the body
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was clad, and the silver watch upon the person. As to these the
administrator was the legal owner, and his appointment, though
made after the occurrence, reached to the death, his title commencing at the time. As to these then the action was maintainable,
and we think that his honor was in error in not so holding: AfcLain's Admr. v. Ilden, Brev. Mass. Rep.; Dealy v. Lance, 2
Speer 485.
But the majority of this court having in the case of .Henry A.
Meetze v. The C. C.
A. Railroad, determined that the circuit
judge had the power to review and reverse the findings of fact of
the referee, and he having exercised that power in this case; the
judgment of this court therefore is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
MCIVER,

A. J., and McGow-N, A. J., concur.

The law as to the rights of living persons over the bodies of deceased human
beings will be considered under the following heads :
First.-Is there any obligation resting
upon society to bury the bodies of deceased persons, and if there is, who is
bound by law to bury the bodies of dead
persons ?
Second.-Can there be property in a
dead body, and how far can it be disposed of by will ?
Third.-If there is any obligation to
bury the bodies of deceased persons have
those on whom the obligation is cast a
right to order post-mortems or dissection ?
Fourth.-If they who are obliged to
bury have the right of ordering postmortems and dissection, are they bound
to bury the body after the post-mortem
or dissection, or can they dispose of it in
any way that is not a nuisance to others ?
First.-Considerations of public policy demand ihat the bodies of persons
deceased must be disposed of so that
they shall not become public nuisances.
In the leading case of Queen v. Stewart,
12 A. & E. 773, which arose on an attempt by the officers of a private hospital to compel the overseers of the par-

ish to bury the body of a deceased pauper
who died within the walls of the hospital,
it was decided that there was a commonlaw right to Christian burial existing in
favor of all persons not within certain
ecclesiastical prohibitions. Lord DENxAN in delivering the judgment of the
court in that case said: "Every person
dying in this country, and not within
certain exclusions laid down by the ecclesiastical law, has a right to Christian
burial, and that implies the right to be
carried from the place where his body lies
to the parish cemetery.."
The cases have laid down no rule as
to what constitutes Christian burial ; but
in England where there is an established
church the significance of such words is
greater than in the United States. The
American authorities all uphold the doctrine of Queen v. Stewart; but in America, where the nature of our institutions
prevents the existence of any ecclesiastical prohibitions, the right to burial must
be general.
A dead man can of course have no
rights, and the so-called right to burial
is consequently an obligation to bury,
which is imposed for the benefit of society
at large and not for the benefit of any
individual upon certain living persons
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hereafter mentioned; and the grounds
for its imposition and enforcement is
public health and decency: Queen v.
Stewart, supra; Wynkoop v. W nkoop,
42 Penn. St. 293.
The principal inquiry is on whom is
this obligation of burying deceased persons cast?
An executor or administrator must
bury the body of his deceased testator or
intestate: Williams v. Williams, L. R.,
20 Ch. Div. 659; s. c. 21 Am. L.
Reg. 508 ; Williams on Executors, 7th
ed., p. 968 ; Wynkoop v. Wpnkoop, supra
2 Black. Com. 508.
In Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, the court
said : "The executor or administrator
must bury the deceased in a manner suitable to the estate he leaves behind him
and such funeral expenses are placed by
an Act of Assembly, in the first class of
preferred debts."
It is also held to be the duty, and hence
the right of the husband or wife to bury
the deceased consort: Weld v. Walker,
130 Mass. 422; Jenkins v. Tucker, I H.
Bl. 90. A parentmust buryhis deceased
child: Reg. v. Vann, 2 Denison's Cr.
Cas. 325.
In this case it appeared that the defendant was entirely destitute ; he had
been offered a loan of money, for the
purpose of burying his child which he
declined to receive on the terms offered.
The child's body remaining unburied
became a nuisance for which the father
was indicted. The judge told the jury
that he was bound to provide for the
burial of his child, if he could obtain the
means for the purpose lawfully, and that
poverty did not excuse him from the liability for the nuisance caused by the body
remaining uninterred, as he was bound
to receive the money; but on a case reserved this direction was held to be wrong
-and Lord CAMPBELL, in delivering the
.unanimous judgment of the court said:
"A man is bound to give Christian bur-1al to his deceased child, if he has the
mcans of doing so; but he is not liable

to be indicted for a nuisance for not
burying his child, if he has not the means
of providing burial for it. He cannot sell the body, put it in a hole, or
throw it into a river; but unless he has
the means of giving the body Christian
burial, he is not liable to be indicted,
even though a nuisance may be occasioned
by leavimg the body unburied."
This dfence would, it seems, extend
to every case of the obligation to bury,
and the law would excuse performance
of this involuntary duty where the person bound has no means for its fulfilment. The law however puts the burden
of burial where there are no executors,
administrators or relatives, upon the
householder in whose house the person
dies : Queen v. Stewart., supra, where
upon this point Lord DExAN said : "It
should seem, that individual under whose
roof a poor person dies is bound to carry
the body decently covered to the place
of burial ; he cannot, therefore, cast him
out, so as to expose the body to violation,
or to offend the feelings or endanger the
health of the living; and for the same
reason he cannot carry him uncovered to
the grave." This language is adopted
in the judgment.of the court inWynkoop
T. Wynkoop, supra.
The householder maybe said to be the
person ultimately bound in every case,
and where there are others primarily
bound who have no means of fulfilling the
obligation, it is submitted that he is liable
just as though these persons did not exist.
The liability of the householder cannot
be explained upon the theory that if the
body were not buried, a nuisance would
result, for he cannot throw the body into
a hole upon his property and cover it up,
whichwould prevent a nuisance resulting,
but he must carry it to the grave decently covered : Queen v. Stewart, supra.
This shows that the obligation is a positive one, requiring active duties, and not
a mere negative one, like the prevention
of perishable elements becoming objectionable by the process of decay.

GRIFFITH v. CHARLOTTE, &c., RAILROAD CO.
It is useless to speculate as to what the
courts will consider too remote a relationship to create the obligation of burying
a deceased relative, but itmay be assumed
that only persons that can be considered
very near in blood or tie, would be held
liable fbr the performance of the duty.
It may be remarked that the question
here considered is at common law; and
statutes have been passed in nearly all
jurisdictions which provide for the burial
or disposition at the public expense, of
the bodies of those persons, whether destitute or not, who leave no friends or
kindred willing to perform the office.
It is interesting to note that in the case
of Queen v. Stewart, the court refused to

and if he neglect or refuse to perform the
office, he may by the express terms of
the canon 68 be suspended by the ordinary for three months. And if any temporal inconvenience arise as a nuisance
from the neglect of interment of the dead
corpse, he is punishable by the temporal
courts by indictment or information."
In answer to the first question it may
be said that there exists an obligation of
burying deceased persons which is imposed primarily on executors, administrators, and certain kindred, and ultimately upon the householder in whose
house the person died. Whether cremation is a fulfilment of this obligation or
not, will be discussed in the reply to the
extend the operation of the statute of
fourth question.
43 Eliz. c. 2, which provided for the reSecond.-That there can be no prolief of the poor while living so as to inperty in a dead body after burial is a
settled principle of law. In 2 Black.
clude the burial of the deceased paupers
Com. 429 the learned commentator says,
not dying In the parish house ; and the
" But though the heir has a property in
court said: "It will probably be found,
the ornaments or escutcheons of his antherefore that when a pauper dies in any
cestors, yet he has none in their bodies
parish house, poor house, or union house,
or ashes; nor can he bring any civil
that circumstance casts on the parish or
action against such as indecently at
union, as the case may be, the duty to
bury the body; not by virtue of the least if not impiously violate and disturb their remains when dead and buried.
statute of Elizabeth, but on the principles
of the common law." See also Directors The person indeed who has the freebold
of Poor v. Uallace, 8 W. & S. 94 ; where of the soil may bring an action of tresit would seem that the court in construing pass against such as dig and disturb it;
and if any one taking up a dead body
the Pennsylvania Act of April l3th 1836,
steals the shroud or other apparel it will
which is a similar statute to 43 Eliz.,
adopted the very construction that the be felony; for the property therefor recourt in Queen v. Stewart thought unwar- mains in the executor, or whoever was
at the charge of the funeral."
rantable.
This principle was law in Lord CoKE'S
The consequence of a refusal to fulfil
time, see 3 Coke's Inst. 203, and modany obligation to bury a deceased person
ern cases affirm the doctrine ; see Reg.
where the person bound has the means
v. Sharpe, 7 Cox Cr. Cas. 214 ; Milfor the purpose will make the offender
liams v. Williams, L. R., 20 Ch. Div.
liable for a nuisance if any inconvenience
659; (s.c. 21 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
results to the public: Reg. v. Vann,
supra, see also Andrews v. Cawthorne, 508, with note by Judge EWELL ;) Weld
Willes 537 note a, which is a note of a v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422.
In the passage cited from Blackstone
case decided by AmxEy, J., on a question
as to burial fees. This language however there is no refeience to the stealing of a
occurs in the decision : "And the burial body being a crime, and in his 4th Book
at 239, he says expressly that the act is
of the dead is (I apprehend) the clear
not a felony, though highly indecent.
duty of any parochial priest and minister;
VOL. XXXIII.-75
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The stealing of the shroud alone is mentioned as criminal. It would seem therefore, that the shroud does not become
realty when deposited in the grave, because if it did, the offence of taking it
away would only be a trespass.
The fact that there is no property in a
corpse, as Blackstone says, prevents the
carrying of one away from being a
felony, such an act, however, is a misdemeanor even at the common law : King
v. Lynn, 2 T. R. 733.
This was
an indictment for taking up a body
for the purpose of dissection, and after
conviction for the offence, it was urged
in arrest of judgment, that if the offence
was a crime at all, it was cognizable only
in the ecclesiastical courts ; but the
court said, " that common decency required that the practice should be put a
stop to ; that the offence was cognizable
in a criminal court, as being highly indecent and contra bonos mores, at the bare
idea of which nature revolted. That the
purpose of taking up the body for dissection did not make it less an indictable
offence."
Though there is no property in a corpse
after burial, there is recognised in England the right of the executor or administrator to the possession of a body before
burial: Reg. v. Fox, 2 Q. B. 246. In
this case a jailor sought to retain the
body of a deceased prisoner until certain
debts were paid. The court, by mandamus, compelled the jailor to deliver the
body to the executors. When it is considered that the body was in the possession of an officer of the court, the case
has no strength as an authority for the
proposition that there is property in a
corpse before burial; there was only recognised a right to possession for the
purpose of interment. See Williams v.
the Williams, supra, at p. 665. In America
courts recognise even after burial a quasi
right of property in dead bodies, but in
the case of Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13
id. 134, which involved the question of
the violation of a cemetery ordinance,

the following doctrine was laid down
by PnRKixs, J. : "The bodies of the
dead belong to the surviving relations in
the order of inheritance, as property, and
they have the right to dispose of them
as such, with restrictions analogous to
those by which the disposition of other
property may be regulated. They cannot be permitted to create a nuisance by
them. We doubt if the burial of the
dead can as a general proposition be
taken out of the hands of the relatives
thereof, they being able and willing to
bury the same."
The logical outcome of this doctrine,
which is antagonistic to the other American cases, would- be to vest the title to
dead bodies, where there are no relatives,
in the state, as the successor to all unclaimed property. The other American
cases do not go further than to recognise
a quasi property in certain relatives for
the purpose of changing the place of
burial.
The right in the husband was recognised in Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422.
See also Fox v. Gordon, 11 W. N. C.
(Pa.) 302. In Wynkoop v. Wynkoop,
supra, a bill was filed by a widow against
the next of kin of her husband to obtain
the removal of the body of her husband
to another cemetery. She claimed the
right in her capacity as administrator and
as the widow. The court decided that
in the first capacity all rights of control
over the body ceased at burial, and that
as widow she had no right to remove the
body against the wishes of the next of
kin.
The suit in Weld v. Walker, was not
brought against the next of kin of the
wife, but against the owners of the grave,
who were related to the deceased wife by
marriage.
The court laid stress on the
fact that the husband had not freely consented to the burial of the wife's body in
the grave with the intention that it should
be the last resting place.
The third conclusion in S. B. Ruagles's Report, in 4 Bradford Surrogate
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Reports 503, is to the effect that the right
to bury a corpse and preserve its remains
belongs exclusively to the next of kin,
in the absefice of testamentary disposition. This conclusion was cited with approval in Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, and the
decisions warrant the assertion that the
prima facie right to control the disposition
of dead bodies after burial is in the next
of kill.
Where the next of kin disagree the
court will not permit removal at instance
of some against the wishes of others:
Lowry v. Plitt, 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) 675.
The court in this case considered that as
the deceased had selected his grave there
was an additional reason for not interfering.
Conclusion 4, of Mr. Ruggles's report,
above cited, is "that tile right to protect
the remains includes the right to preserve
them by separate burial, to select the place
ofsepulture,and to change it at pleasure."
It would seem, however, that the recognition of this right is discretionary
with the court, and that at least a good
reason for removal must be shown.
In Secor's Case, 31 Leg. Int. 268,
the widow having interred the body of
her deceased husband, the son claimed
the right to remove under instructions
from his deceased father. The court
however restrained him from so doing,
and this language was used in the
decision: "A proper respect for the
dead, a regard for the sensibilities of the
living, and the due preservation of the
public health, require that a corpse should
not be disinterred or transported from
place to place except under extreme circumstances of exigency."
The courts of equity have jurisdiction
over controversies relating to the removal
of dead bodies, and to that forum is consigned the protection of graves: Weld
v. Walker, supra. The courts of equity
in America in the opinion of Mr. Justice
GRAY have a jurisdiction in this respect
similar to that possessed by the ecclesiastical courts of England.

In Beatty v. Ritchie, 2 Peters 566, Mr.
Justice STORY, alluding to the attempt
of certain heirs to get possession of a lot
of ground dedicated by their ancestor
for burial purposes and used for these
purposes formanyyears, said, at p. 584:
"This is not the case of a mere private
trespass; but a public nuisance ; going
to the irreparable injury of the Georgetown congregation of Lutherans. The
property consecrated to their use by a
perpetual servitude or easement, is to be
taken from them ; the sepulchres of the
dead are to be violated ; the feelings of
religion, and the sentiment of natural
affection of the kindred and friends of
the deceased are to be wounded : and the
memorials erected by piety or love, to
the memory of the good, are to be removed, so as to leave no trace of the
last home of their ancestry to those who
may visit the spot in future generations.
It cannot be that such acts are to be redressed by the ordinary process of law.
The remedy must be sought, if at all, in
the protecting power of a court of chancery ; operating by its injunction to preserve the repose of the ashes of the dead,
and the religious sensibilities of the
living."
See also In re Stephen Girard,4 Am.
Law Jour. (N. S.) p. 97, where the
court took the view that a court of equity
was the proper forum for the settlement
of controversies concerning the removal
of dead bodies after burial.
In 6 Am. Law Rev. 182, there is a
report of an Ohio case (which is not contained in the regular reports), which held
that the custody over a body before burial was a quasi right of property, the
violation of which was the basis of an
action in the nature of a tort. The case
was one where the defendants, a body of
physicians, obtained permission to dissect
a part of a body, promising to give the
body burial after the dissection. They
broke this agreement, putting timbers
and straw into a box and sending this as
the body to a cemetery for interment, pra-
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his body to a lady who was not his executrix, having previously given her certain
directions by letter as to its cremation.
le directed the executors by his will to
pay the expense of the disposal. The
relatives would not consent to having the
body burned, and obtaining the consent
of the executrix buried it. Subsequently
the lady obtained a license to remove the
remains to another cemetery, and upon
this authority removed the body, cremated it and then sued the executors for
the expenses. The dourt held that the
cremation under the pretence of removling of the body was a fraud on the
license, which itself prevented her recovering for her expenses; but the court,
KAyr, J., delivering the opinion, held that
the bequest of the body was of no effect:
"It follows from these cases (Reg. v.
Sharpe, Reg. v. Fox) that a man cannot
dispose of his body by will. I asked
whether there was any authority contrary
to that, and I have been referred to
none. Accordingly, the direction in the
codicil that the testator's body was to
be delivered to the plaintiff, who is not
an executrix, is bad in law and void.
She had no property in the body, and
could not have enforced delivery of it to
her."
This is conclusive of the question,
and when we consider that property in a
force, and for an infringement of which dead body can only begin when the living body becomes inanimate, i. e., at the
an action will lie."
moment of death, it follows that proThe judge concluded his decision with
these forcible words: "The old English perty in one's own body can never arise.
Can a man order the particular mode
decisions referred to by the defendant
of disposition of his body? This depends
only establish that a body is not property.
They do not show that there may not be on whether his wishes are binding upon
rights attached to a dead body, rights to the person bound to bury his remains ?
It is difficult to see how any mere recare for it, watch over it, and bury it,
which the law will protect. If they did quest could be made binding upon the
hold that no such rights existed, in this custodian unless he received money from
the testator for the purpose of such disage and in this country, the court would
position, for the common-law right is to
feel it its duty to disregard them."
burial, and to burial alone, and not to
There is no power to dispose of one's
any mode that the fancy of the person
body by will. The case of Williams v.
dying should suggest. A man cannot
Williams, supra, is authority for this proposition. In that case the testator gave. bequeath his body, and to direct any

viously holding funeral services over the

rubbish. The fraud was discovered and
the body found half naked in a dissecting room of a medical college. The action was brought by the husband, averring'damages for laceration of feelings.
One count sounded in tort, and was
chiefly based on fraud. There were
other counts based on the violation of the
agreement. There was a demurrer to
the first count, and it was contended for
the defence that there was no action in
any one for an injury to a corpse, there
being no property in the subject-matter.
PRENTISS, J., overruled' the demurrer
and said: "The law gives the husband
the right to the custody of the dead body
of his wife, a parent of a child and a
child of a parent. But it would be useless to give this right if the husband is
not protected in its exercise. There is
in this state no statute making it a criminal act to interfere with this right. The
remedy, if there is any, must be by a
civil action. It would be idle to say that
the husband has a right to protect his
wife's dead body from insult and to its
care and custody for the purpose of burying it, if he has no means to protect and
enforce the right. A body itself may
not be property; but this right may be
called perhaps aquasi property. At any
rate it is a right which the law will en-
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mode of disposal is an exercise of control over it just as if it were property,
and consequently subject to the same objection as a bequest of the body itself.
A trust for the purpose of some peculiar disposition could only be effective
where the trustee was the executor or
legal custodian of the body, because only
the executor or custodian of the body has
a right to possession of the corpse before
burial : Williams v. Williams, supra. Such
a trust is analogous to a trust to keeptombstones in repair; there being no cestui que
trust; the object for which the money
is applied is left to the conscience of the
quasi trustee. Such a trust cannot be sustained as a charity, the purpose of the
trust being entirely selfish. See Bispham on Equity, 2d ed., p. 168.
If
however property is given with a charge
to keep tombstones or graves in repair,
and for other purposes, the courts disregard the charge for the purpose of
keeping the graves or tombstones in repair, treating it as invalid, but apply the
whole to the valid trusts: Fisk v. Attorney General,L. R., 4 Eq. 521 ; Dawson
v. Small, L. R., 18 Eq. 114.
In Dawson v. Small, there was a gift to
a trustee of a certain amount of property, the income of which was to be ap.
plied to keeping certain tombstones in
repair, including that to be erected over
the testator, the residue left after this
purpose was effected was to be given to
poor persons over fifty years of age who
were members of a certain religious
society.
Vice-Ch. BACON, in delivering the
opinion of the court, at p. 118, speaking
of the obligation to keep the grave in
repair, said: The obligation, if it may
be so called isdischarged. It is an obligation either to be performed or not as
the persons to whom the custody of the
money is given, think fit, and all that is
yielded from the annual income of the
devised estates, goes therefore to the
charitable purposes which the testator has
pointed out. The obligation to keep up
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the tombstones is merely honorary: but
the obligation to give all that is not applied for the purposes first mentioned in
favor of these poor people, is by no
means honorary; it is a trust that must
be executed."
In the case of Pierce v. Swan Point
Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227, at p. 239, this
passage occurs : "Most persons look
forward to the proper disposition of their
remains, and it is natural that they should
feel anxiety on the subject. And the
right of a person to provide by will for
the disposition of his body has been
generally recognised. We have already
seen that by the canon law, a person has
the right to direct his place of sepulture."
It will be seen, however, from the
authorities we have just been considering
that they do not warrant the statement
of the learned judge, and it is submitted that the probable meaning of the
judge's words may be that popular fceling is in favor of the existence of this
right.
The present state of the law warrants
the assertion, that a body cannot be disposed of by will as a gift, nor can any
particular mode of disposition which shall
bind the executor, be provided for effectively; a gift upon condition that a certain mode of disposition be made, would
be like any other gift or condition. (See
Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255,
which was a gift of an annuity on condition that a tomb was kept in repair.)
Such a gift would have to be made to a
person like an executor who alone would
have control .of the body after death
(Williams v. Williams) to have any
chance of being effective, and even then
the will of the donee, and not that of the
donor, would determine whether the body
should be disposed of as desired or not
for the gift would only be an inducement
for the donee to comply with the wishes
of the deceased ; his rdfusal to accept
the terms of the gift would destroy the
effectiveness of this attempt to secure n
certain kind of disposition. The disposi-
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tion asked for must of course be a legal one,
i. e., it must not be against public policy.
Third.-Upon the point raised by
the third question, there is absolutely
no authority. We must find an answer
in the analogies furnished by the author.
ities. Those who have the obligation of
burying a body have the right to the custody of it for that purpose; now have
they any further rights ? A post-mortem
is for the purpose of setting aside all uncertainty as to the mode,of death. This
is something that the policy of the law
favors, and a custoitian of a body, it is
thought would be allowed to order one to
be made. Dissection differs from a postmortem ; it'is an experimental operation
for scientific purposes, beneficial as such,
and the policy of the law is not against
the practice. Now can a custodian of a
body order a dissection to be made. This
will depend on whether in so doing he
violates his obligation to bury the body
or oversteps in any way the rights conferred on him by law as custodian. In
Queen v. Price, 21 Am. L. IReg. 560, at
p. 565, Mr. Justice STErHEN says, that

the practice of anatomy is lawful, but at
page 564 speaking of a statute making it
lawful for executors or persons having
lawful possession of bodies to deliver up
the bodies for dissection, except in certain cases, he says it is inconsistent with
the theory that there is an absolute duty
on persons having charge of dead bodies
to bury them; but it is submitted that
the courts never have laid down that this
obligation was anything except to ultimately dispose of the body by burial, and
all acts antecedent to interment which do
not violate the criminal or civil laws as
to the rights of the custodian would
always have been permitted.
The mere fact that a custodian has
rights over a body even for the purpose
of burial leads to the conclusion that
there is a quasi property in it. In
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, PoTrER, J., after coming to the conclusion
that there was quasi property in a body

said : "but the person having charge of
it cannot be said to be the owner in any
sense whatever : he holds it as the sacred
trust for the benefit of all who may from
family or friendship have in interest in
it, and we think that a court of equity
may well regulate it as such, &c." Upon
the theory of this case, the control of a
custodian depends on the consent of the
relatives of the deceased, but the only
case which the court intimated would
furnish ground for interference was preventing the relatives rom visiting a grave
for the purpose of testifying their respect
to the deceased. The principle of the
case is broad enough however to warrant
the court's interference to prevent dissection, and whether it be put upon the
ground indicated in Piercev. The Cemetery, supra, or upon the general exercise
of a court's discretion in the matter of
burial it is thought that the courts would
interfere to prevent the practice of dissection, by injunction, where relatives of
the deceased near enough in blood objected. The court in so doing would
recognise the popular prejudice against
the practice, on the ground that permitting the operation might injure the sensibilities of the living.
These sensibilities would perhaps not
be considered if it was the wish of the
deceased that the operation was to be
performed. This is not inconsistent
with what has been previously said, for
though the deceased has no absolute right
to order the disposition of his body, his
wishes may render the exercise of the
custodian's discretion valid and so prevent the interference of relatives. If
there were no relatives of a sufficiently
near degree, the ground fbr invoking the
aid of the court falls.
Fourth.-The probable orgin of the
common-law obligation of burial is to be
found in the parochial system of England.
See Piercev. Swan Point Cemetery, supra.
That system recognised the right of every
parishioner to burial in the parish church
yard.
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The common-law obligation to bury
does not depend on the law of expediency
alone, 1br the obligation is not only to
prevent a nuisance by burying the body,
but to bury decently i. e., as the courts
hold, with a shroud : Gilbertv. Buzzard,
2 Hag. Con. Rep. 333; Queen v. Stewart, supra. The law of expediency would
sanction any form of disposition that
secures public health, but the sentiment
which surrounds the disposal of the dead
demands 'some ceremonious form of disposition.
The case of Bogert v. Indianapolis,
supra, is contrary to this proposition,
for the court in holding that the bodies
of deceased persons were property, held
consistently that the dispositions of such
bodies was to be regulated only by rules
in regard to all property. The court
said : "1Tie relatives have the right to
dispose of dead bodies of their deceased
relatives as property within restrictions
analogous to those by which the disposition of other property is regulated. They
cannot be permitted to create a nuisance
by them."
For sanitary purposes hlone a body
could be reduced to ashes by quicklime or
acids, but that any such form could be a
fulfilment of a religious duty, such as the
obligation to burial was in its origin, and
which character it is thought it still retains, is impossible. In Williams v.
Williams, the court in spcaking of the
directions of the deceased for the cremation of his body said : The purpose named
in the letter cannot make the gift either
better or worse, but it was confessedly
for cremation, and a question might arise
whether that was legal-according to the
law. of this country. That question,
however, I shall iot decide."
The question arose directly in Queen v.
Price, above cited, where upon an indictment for burning the body of his child
instead of burying it, the defendant was
acquitted. It appeared that the prisoner
whose child died, took the body out upon
a vacant lot, and putting it into a cask of

petroleum set fire to it ; a crowd collected and some one put the fire out,
and had the father arrested and taken before the magistrate, who committed him.
The charge of STEPHEN , J., before the

grand jury which indicted him contains
many remarkable statements as to the
law. In reviewing the case of Williams
T. Williams, the judge took occasion to
say, (page 567): "The question arises
in the present case in a perfectly clear
and simple form, unembarrassed by any
such consideration as applies to the other
cases to which I have referred. There is
no question here of the illegality and dishonesty which marked the conduct of
those that were described as resurrectionmen, nor of the artifices, not indeed
criminal, but certainly disingenuous, by
which possession of the body was obtained
in the case of Reg. v. Sharpe and Tirlliams v. Williams. Price had lawful possession of the child's body, and it was
not only his right but his duty to dispose
of it by burying, or in any other manner
not in itself illegal. Hence I must consider the question, whether to burn a
dead body instead of burying it is in
itself an illegal act.
"After full consideration, I am of
opinion that a person who burns instead
of burying a dead body does not commit
a criminal act, unless he does it in such a
manner as to amount to apublie nuisance
at common law. My reason for this
opinion is, that upon the fullest examination of the authorities, I have, as the
preceding review of them shows, been
unable to discover any authority for the
proposition that it is a misdemeanor to
burn a dead body, and in the absence of
such authority I feel that I have no right
to declare it to be one.
"There are some instances no doubt
in which courts of justice have declared
acts to be misdemeanors, which had never
previously been decided to be so, but I
think it will be found that in every such
case the act involved great public mischief or moral scandal. It is not my
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place to offer any opinion on the comparative merits of burning and burying
corpses, but before I could hold that it
must be a misdemeanor to burn a dead
body, I must be satisfied not only that
some people, or even that many people object to the practice, but that it is on plain
undeniable grounds, highly mischievous
or grossly scandalous."
The learned judge continued (p. 568.)
"There are, no doubt, religious convictions and feelings connected with the
subject which every one would wish to
treat with respect dind tenderness, and I
suppose there is no doubt that as a mat-er of historical fact, the disuse of burning bodies was due to the force of those
sentiments. I do not think, however,
that it can be said, that every practice
that startles and jars upon the religious
sentiments of the population, is for that
reason a misdemeanor at common law.
The statement of such a proposition, in
plain words, is a sufficient refutation of
it, but nothing short of this will support
the conclusion that to burn a dead body
must be a misdemeanor. As to the public interest in the matter, burning, on one
hand, effectually prevents the bodies of
the dead from poisoning the living. On
the other hand, it might, no doubt, destroy the evidence of the crime. These
however, are matters for the legislature
and not for me. It may be that it would
be well for Parliament to regulate or forbid the burning of bodies, but the great
leading rule of criminal law is that nothing is a crime unless it is plainly forbidden by law. This rule is no doubt
subject to exceptions, but they are rare,
narrow, and to be admitted with the
greatest reluctance upon th strongest
reasons.'I

These eloquent remarks seriously impeach the cases which have declared the
existence of a common-law right to burial
(understood in the popular sense of the
word) and the reasoning goes far towards
sustaining any such right on grounds of
expediency alone. The weightiest objection to this declaration of the law is that

public policy is very seriously against this
mode of disposal, as proper precautions
to first determine the mode of death, are
not required by positive law. By reducing a body to ashes, crime can easily
be hidden. This did not weigh very
seriously with the learned judge, who
noticed the objection in the course of his
opinion, but did not think it of sufficient
force to condemn the practice of cremation.
Whether cremation is lawful or not it
is the subject of popular prejudice, just
as dissection is, and the Courts should
therefore interfere in favor of relatives
to forbid the act unless the deceased has
asked for such disposal. As the ground
on which the obligation of burial is enforced is public health and public decency
the improper disposal of a body cannot
be the subject of any claims by relatives
in the nature of a civil suit for damages.
The Ohio case cited, though contrary
to this, loses much of its strength when
it is considered that there was no law in
the state making such an act criminal.
The court felt the necessity of punishing
the misconduct. Any improper dealing
with a body either in the mode of disposal or in any indignity put upon it
must be an infringement of the commonlaw right to burial in order to warrant
the interference of the law at all and then
it is submitted that such acts would probably be criminal.
It may be said that assuming that
dissections and post-mortems would be
allowed, the common-law right to burial
requires that the bodies of the persons
should be buried after the dissections or
post-mortems. Since the case of Queen v.
Price, it is very difficult to say exactly
what form of disposal would be illegal.
The reasoning of the learned judge could
have been invoked just as strongly in
favor of a reduction to ashes by quicklime as it was in that case in favor of
petroleum. The writer can only leave
this question in the uncertainty in which
the cases leave it.
L. V. BRIGHT.
Philadelphia.
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A regulation that each scholar, when returning to school after recess, shall bring
into the school-room a stick of wood for the fire, is not " needful" for the government, good order and efficiency of the schools, and a scholar cannot be suspended for
a refusal to comply with such regulation.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLE, C. J.-One can but express surprise that any intelligent
teacher or intelligent board of education should suffer such a case
as this to reach the courts. The fact that it is here can only be
accounted for on the ground that either the teacher or the board
of education, perhaps both, have sadly misconceived their powers
and duties, or have been actuated by some improper motive in
excluding the relator's son from the public school. The reasons for
excluding him, as stated in the return, are, in substance, that the
board of education-which is clothed with power to make rules and
regulations for the government and organization of schools, for the
reception and instruction of pupils, and for the preservation of good
order and discipline in schools-did, long prior to the supposed
grievance of the relator, enact certain rules, among which were
these: "Rule 27. Any pupil guilty of disobedience to a teacher,
or of gross misconduct, may be suspended by the principal."
"Rule 29. Any pupil suspended from school by virtue of any one
of the foregoing rules can be readmitted only by bringing a written
permit from the superintendent."
It is then stated that for many years there had existed in all the
schools of 'the city of Fond du Lae, except the high school, a
regulation known and approved by the board, whereby the teachers
of the several schools have been authorized to and have required
each pupil of gufflicient age and bodily strength, upon returning
from the play-ground at recess, to bring with him a stick of wood
fitted for stove use, to supply the stoves with fuel in the rooms
occupied by such pupils, and to keep the rooms warm and comfortable. It is for a refusal of the relator's son to conform to this
regulation that he was suspended.
VOL.
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It is further stated that the refusal of the boy was in presence
of the scholars of the school, and was without cause other than to
cause a breach of the order and direction of the teacher and
principal, and in defiance of their authority, and was calculated to
liring such authority into contempt, &c. On account of the
disobedience of the pupil to conform to this regulation, to sustain
his authority over and discipline in the school, the principal and
teacher caused the pupil to be suspended, and notices thereof in
writing to be given to the relator and superintendent.
In contesting the sufficiency of this return, the learned counsel
for the relator insists tkat the rule or regulation requiring pupils to
bring up vood for use in the school-room is unreasonable, and not
binding upon any pupil who does not wish to comply with it; that
it does not relate to a subject which concerns the education of pupils
or discipline in the schools; therefore that the board had no right
to adopt and enforce it to the extent of excluding a pupil who did
not conform to it. He says our public schools are organized and
maintained for the education and improvement of children in
learning; that no rule is proper which does not conduce to these
ends-that does not in some way promote the good order or government of the schools; secure the decorum and quiet in the schoolroom which are essential for advantageous instruction and discipline.
Consequently any rule or regulation which has for its object anything outside of the instruction of the pupil-the order requisite
for instruction-is beyond the province of the board of education
to adopt. The requirement that school children should bring up
wood, when not by way of punishment or discipline for misconduct,
has nothing to do with the education of the child. It is nothing
but manual labor, pure and simple, and has no relation to mental
development. If a child can be compelled to bring up wood, he
can be made to saw and split it before it is brought up; he can be
compelled to bring it to the school-yard and throw it in the basement; can be made to clear the sidewalk of snow, wash the
windows, or do any other menial work about the school-house and
ground. It seems to us difficult to escape the force of this
argument.
School boards-and boards of education have important duties to
discharge, and we have no disposition, as our decisions show (Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59; State v. Burton, 45 Id. 150), to circumscribe their powers in too narrow a compass. The statute
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clothes them with power to make all needful rules for the government of the schools established within their respective jurisdiction,
and to suspend any pupil from the privileges of the school for noncompliance with the rules established by them, or by the teacher
with their consent: Section 439, Rev. Stat. subc. 15 (sect. 10. c.
152, Laws 1883, p. 426). While from the necessity of the case
much discretion must be left to these boards as to the nature of the
rules which are prescribed, yet it cannot fairly be claimed that the
boards are uncontrolled in the exercise of their discretion and
judgment upon the subject. The rules and regulations made must
be reasonable and proper, or,- in the language of the statute,
"needful" for the government, good order, and efficiency of the
schools-such as will best advance the pupils in their studies, tend
to their education and mental improvement, and promote their
interest and welfare. But the rules and regulations must relate to
these objects. The boards are not at liberty to adopt rules
relating to other subjects according to their humor or fancy, and
make a disobedience of such a rule by a pupil cause for his
suspension or expulsion. We therefore think the rule or regulation
requiring the pupil to bring up wood for use in the school-room was
one which the board had no right to make and enforce.
But if we are wrong in this view, the relation shows a most
satisfactory excuse on the part of the boy for failing to conform
to it. It is set forth therein that the relator saw the teacher,
Mr. Bond, about the 13th of February 1884, and informed him
that his son was physically weak, unable to carry up wood, and
requested the teacher to excuse the boy from performing that work.
Notwithstanding this request the teacher required the boy to bring
up wood. Again the relator saw Mr. Bond, explained to him the
condition of his son's health, that he had had diphtheria,and had a
chronic difficulty in his side, which was aggravated by his carrying
up wood, and asked that his son be excused therefrom. Still Mr.
Bond insisted that the boy should obey the rule and bring up wood,
and directed him to do so. The relator saw Mr. Bond the third
time, and informed him that he had instructed his son not to carry
up wood, and that if he (Bond) should order him so to do, he must
expect the boy to refuse. On the 26th of February 1884, when
the teacher again required the boy to bring up wood, thle boy told
him he could not, under his father's orders. Thereupon the boy
was suspended from -school. The great forbearance and good
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nature manifested by the father in this case are not usual 'ith
parents, still they are commendable. One would naturally suppose
if "the element of mildness and sweet reasonableness" had been
very strongly at work in the spirit of Mr. Bond, he would have
yielded to the request of the father, thus three times made. But
obedience must be rendered to the rule ruat ecelum.
This is not a case of a conflict between the authority of the parent
and the board or teacher in a matter where such board or teacher
has a right to prescribe a rule for the obedience of a pupil. If the
case involved that question it would be different. The relator made
some efforts to get his son reinstated in school under Rule 29. We
shall not notice the steps taken by him for the purpose, holding as
we do that the boy was wrongfully suspended in the first instance.
A question was made as to whether ihe relator should not have proceeded against the city superintendent, and not against the board
of education. The superintendent is elected by the board, and is
under its control: Subchapter 3, § 2, Charter. The boara makes
the rules for the government of the schools : Subchapter 15, Charter. The board certainly had power to reinstate the relator's son,
and it was its duty to do so under the circumstances.
The return is defective in law for the reasons given, and the demurrer to it should have been sustained. The order of the circuit
court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
The principal case is certainly one of
the most remarkable, if not the most so,
of all the cases upon the subject of the
relation of teacher and pupil, to be found
in the books, and is a remarkable illustration of the stupidity and obstinacy too
often found in inferior municipalities,
As to the correctness of the decision of
the court in this case there is absolutely
no doubt whatever. In the case of the
State v. Burton, 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)
233, decided by the same learned court,

we took occasion to make an exhaustive
collection of the reported cases upon tile
powers and duties of school teachers and
school boards, as respects the regulation,
correction and restraint of the pupils
under their charge. If any authority is
necessary beyond the reasoning of the
court in the principal case, it may be
found there.
MARSHALL D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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HART v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
A regulation by a telegraph company that its liability for errors in, or failure to
deliver, a message shall not extend beyond the sum received for sending it, unless
the message is repeated, for which service an additional price is charged, is reasonable and binding on the sender.

HART v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.
Under the California Code telegraph companies are not common carriers, and in
an action against them for the erroneous transmission of a message the burden is on
the plaintiff to ;how that the loss vas occasioned by wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the company. The judgment of the court in department, reported ante, page 320, reversed.
THORNTON and McKEE, JJ., dissent.

THE facts of this case when before three of the judges in department are reported, ante, page 320, where the opinion there delivered is printed in full. Upon consideration by the court in banc
the judgment delivered in department was reversed, the following
opinions being delivered.
Ross, J.-Further consideration has convinced us that some
of the views should be modified, and the rulings in some respects
changed. The case as expressed when this case was considered in
department should be this:
On the 15th day of December 1882, the plaintiff delivered to
the defendant, at its Stockton office, this message:
"GEORGE W. MCNEAR, San Francisco: Buy bail barley falun;
report by mail.
GEORGE HART."
The message was promptly transmitted and delivered as written,
except that the word "bail" was changed to the word "bain." By
the private cipher code of McNear, used by the plaintiff in the
message, the word "bail" means "100 tons," and the word "bain"
means "225 tons." As the message was delivered it directed MeNear to buy for the account of the plaintiff 225 tons of barley,
whereas as it was written by the plaintiff, MeNear was directed to
buy on plaintiff's account 100 tons only. Acting on the message
received, McNear bought for plaintiff 200 tons of barley. When
the plaintiff discovered that fact he notified the defendant that 100
tons had been bought in excess of that directed to be bought by the
original message, and asked the defendant what he should do with
the surplus so purchased ? Defendant refused to give any instruction in regard to it. Plaintiff therefpon sold the barley at the
highest market rate, his loss on the extra 100 tons being $429.82.
It is for the loss thus sustained by him that the action is brought.
At the trial the only proof given by the plaintiff to show negligence on the part of the defendant was the admitted fact that the
message was delivered in its altered form. It was also admitted
that the message was written by the plaintiff, upon a printed form
prepared by the defendant, underneath the words, "Send the fol-
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lowing message, subject to the above terms, which are hereby agreed
to," and that among the "above terms" referred to are the following:
"To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender of a message
should order it repeated; that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For this, one-half the regular rate is
charged in addition. It is agreed between the sender of the following message and this company, that said company shall not be
liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery or for
non-delivery of any unrepeated message, whether happening by
negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount received
for sending the same; nor for mistakes or delay§ in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery of any repeated message beyond fifty times the sum received for sending the same, unless specially insured; nor in any case for delays arising from unavoidable
interruptions in the working of its lines, or for errors in cipher or
obscure messages."
That the message in question was not directed to be "repeated"
is conceded by the plaintiff, and on the part of the appellant, it is
contended that as the message was not repeated, appellant is not
responsible in damages beyond the amount received for its transmission, and this because it so declared in the conditions printed at
the head of the form upon which the dispatch was written, and to
which, as is claimed, the plaintiff assented. In department we held
that telegraph companies are exempt only for errors arising from
causes beyond their own control. In the first place, this rule would
extend the liability of such companies beyond that declared by
statute in this state. Originally, sect. 2162 of the Civil Code read,
"A carrier of messages for reward must use great care and diligence in the transmission and delivery of messages. A carrier by
telegraph must use the utmost diligence therein;" and section
2168 of the same code originally read: "Every one who offers to
the public to carry persons, property or messages, is a common
carrier of whatever he thus offers to carry." But in 1874 these
sections were amended and made to read as follows:
" Section 2162. A carrier of messages for reward must use
great care and diligence in the transmission and delivery of passengers.
"Section 2168. Every one who offers to the public to carry'
persons, property or messages, excepting only telegraphic messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to carry."
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By statute, therefore, a telegraph company in this state is not a
common carrier, and the degree of care and diligence exacted of
such companies in the transmission and delivery of messages is
"great care and diligence." If great care and diligence-which
terms of course include the employment of proper instruments and
competent operators-:-be exercised by the company in the transmission and delivery of a message, the degree of care prescribed
by the statute .is complied with. In the next place, the effect of
holding that telegraph companies are exempt only for errors
arising from causes beyond their control, would be to hold that
such companies cannot, by stipulation, limit their liability to any
extent; for since they are not common carriers or insurers, in no
event would they be liable for errors arising from causes beyond
their own control. With respect to such stipulations the decisions
of the courts are very conflicting.
In Illinois, Maine and Wisconsin, it is held that there can be no
consideration for such a stipulation on the part of the sender of the
message, and, that so far as he is concerned, it is void for that
reason, although fully assented to by him: Tyler v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 60 Ill. 421: s. c. 74 Id. 168 ; Candee v. W. U. Tel. Co., 34
Wis. 477; Bartlett v. TV. U. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 218. It is further held in these cases that such a stipulation is contrary to public
policy, and for that reason, also, is void. On the contrary, the
cases are very numerous that hold that a stipulation providing that
the liability of the company for any mistake or delay in the transmission or delivery of a message, or for not delivering the same,
shall not extend beyond the sum received for sending it, unless the
sender orders the message to be repeated by sending it back to the
office which first received it, and pays half of the regular rate
additional, is a reasonable precaution to be taken by the company,
and binding upon all who assent to it, so as to exempt the company from liability beyond the amount stipulated, for any cause
except wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the
company: Grinnell v. WV. U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299; W. U.
Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525; Camp v. TV. U. Tel. Co., 1
Met. (Ky.) 164; Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 182; Passmore v. WF U. Tel. Co., 78 Penn. St. 188 ; Lassiter v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 89 N. 0. 384, and numerous cases collected inthe note
to the case of The W. U. Tel. Co. v. Blanchard,reported in 45
Amer. Rep. p. 486.
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There is still another class of cases, of which Sweatland v. 1ll.

Miss. Tel. Co., 27 Iowa 433, is one, which maintain that such
a stipulation should not be held to exonerate or release the company from damages caused by defective instruments, or a want
of- skill or ordinary care on the part of its operators. But as this
latter class of cases concede that telegraph companies are not
common carriers, their liability must rest on the ground of negligence or wilful misconduct, which is fraud. Fraudulent conduct
on the part of the company would, of course, vitiaie such a stipulation, but to say that no stipulation can be made limiting their
liability for negligence, is, to say in effect, that no stipulation can
be made limiting their liability at all. It seems to us, therefore,
that we must either hold, as did the courts in Illinois, Maine and
Wisconsin, that such stipulations are invalid, because unsupported
by a consideration and contrary to public policy, or that it is competent for telegraph companies to stipulate for the limitation of
their liability for errors arising from any cause except wilful misconduct or gross negligence. As respects the question of consideration, it is enough to say that if the stipulation is one that
can be made, it is a part of the contract, and is supported by the
same consideration that supports the contract for the transmission
and delivery of the message. With respect to the reasonableness
of stipulations of the character of that under consideration, we
find, upon careful examination, that according to the weight of
authority, a regulation that the liability of the company for any
mistake or delay in the transmission or delivery of a message, or
for not delivering the same, shall not extend beyond the sum
received for sending it, unless the sender orders the message to be
repeated by sending it back to the office which first received it, and
pays half the regular rate additional, is a reasonable precaution to
be taken by the company, and binding upon all who assent to it,
so as to exempt the company from liability beyond the amount
stipulated for, for any cause except wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the company; and we so hold. It would
serve no useful purpose to state at length the reasons given by the
various courts in support of this conclusion. It is sufficient to say,
generally, that they are founded in the peculiar nature of the
employment ; the extraordinary risks attending it, against many
of which human foresight cannot provide; in the fact that the
thing-the message-with which the company is intrusted is of no
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intrinsic value: that the importance of it cannot be eshmated
except by the sender; for the transmission of which there must be
a simple rate of compensation, and the measure of damages for a
failure to transmit br deliver which, has no relation to any value
which can be put on the message itself.
The action of the court below, with respect to the instructions,
was not in accord with these views. As the case must therefore
be sent back for a new trial, it is proper that we should determine
upon which party rests the burden of proof. But for the stipulation, the plaintiff having proved the mistake in the message as
believed, the onus would undoubtedly be upon the defendant to
excuse its breach of the contract to transmit and deliver the message. But the contract having included a stipulation to the effect
that unless repeated, the defendant should not be held liable for
any mistake or delay in the transmission or delivery of the message, or for not d*elivering the same, beyond the sum received for
sending it, unless the mistake, delay or failure arose from the wilful misconduct or gross neglect of the defendant, the plaintiff's
right to recover more than the amount paid for sending the message (for which defendant in the present case by its answer offered
to allow judgment) could not be established, except by proving
wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the defendant.
Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded for a new
trial.
We concur: MYRIClc, J., SHARPsTI N, J., MoRisOm, 0. J.,
MICKINSTRY, J.
MCKEE, J.-I
dissent. This was an action to recover damages
for failure to transmit and deliver a cipher message to the person
to whom it was addressed. On the 15th of December 1882, plaintiff delivered to the manager of the defendant, at its office in
Stockton, for transmission to San Francisco, the following cipher
message:

-

"December 15, 1882.
To GEo. W. McNrAiR, San Francisco: Buy bail barley. Falun
report by mail.
GE!o. HART."
8 collect.
Upon the receipt of the message at the Stockton office, the
operator of the defendant promptly attempted to send it to San
IVo. XXXIII.-77

HART v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.

Francisco ; but it was received in the San Francisco office in the
following form:
"Stockton, Cal., Dec. 15.
San Francisco, December 15.
GEo. W. McNEAR: Buy bain barley falun. Report by mail.

R.

GEORGE HART."

and in that form it was delivered to the person to whom it was
addressed.
It will be observed that the substantial difference between the
two messages is, that the word "bail," in the message delivered
for transmission, is changed to the word " bain ,"in the message as
received and delivered. Now, both words formed part of the
secret cipher code of the sender and receiver of the message; and,
according to that code, the word "bail" meant 100 tons, and the
word " bain " meant 225 tons. So that upon receipt of the message, as delivered to him, the plaintiff's agent immediately purchased for the plaintiff 225 tons, instead of 100 tons of barley;
and this resulted in a loss to the plaintiff of $430, for which he
seeks to make the defendant liable.
In the case there is no conflict of evidence. It is admitted that
the word "bail" was plainly written in the message which the
plaintiff delivered to the manager of the defendant's office at
Stockton. It was also proved, by evidence in which there is no
conflict, that the message, as delivered, was carefully read by the
manager, and by him handed to the operator for transmission;
that it was promptly transmitted over the wires to San Francisco ;
that the operator at the San Francisco office and at the Stockton
office, were both competent and experienced telegraph operators,
and that the message was delivered in its altered form-the mistake consisting in the spelling of the word "bail." In telegraphic
orthography the word "bail," is spelled thus: "B" is a dash and
three dots; "a" is a dot and a dash; "i" is two dots, and "1" is,
a dash. "Bain" is spelled by the same lines and dots, except
that the letter "n" is a dash and a dot. The actual mistake in
the message was, therefore, the addition of a dot to the line in the
last letter of the word ; and the question is, whether that mistake
was the result of negligence on the part of the officers or agents of
the defendant in the transmission of the message.
Under the code a telegraph company is not a common carrier

HART v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.

(sect. 2168, 0. 0.); it is, however, a carrier of messages for
reward (sect. 2161, Id.), and, as such, it works under a law which
binds it to the exercise of great care and diligence in the transmission and deliveiy of messages (sect. 2162, Id.). Like any
other corporation or person it is therefore bound, in the exercise
of its legal rights, to p~rform its duty without causing injury or
less to any one; and if it omits to perform in good faith any obligation imposed on it by law, it is liable for the consequences. No
contract which it may make by its rules or regulations is allowed
to exempt it from liability for misfeasance or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duties. Such regulations for exemptions or
immunity from liability for error or mistake, which results in loss
to another, from the fraud or neglect of itself or its subordinate
officers or agents, are considered in law as unreasonable, and being
against public policy are void: Sweatland v. Ill. Tel. Co., 27
Iowa 443; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 429; U. S.
Tel. Co. v. aildersleve, 29 Md. 233; 33 Id. 248; Tel. Co. v.
Fontaine, 58 Ga. 433; BIlis v. Am. Tel. Co., 13 Allen 226. If,
therefore, a mistake occurs in the transmission of a message, from
the fraud or neglect of the company, or any of its officers or agents,
which results in loss to the sender or receiver of the message, the
company is liable for the loss: sect. 1714, C. 0.
In the case in hand plaintiff proved the mistake; in fact, it was
admitted, and the loss which it occasioned him. That proof canstituted a primafacie case upon which he was entitled to recover
in the action. It was not necessary for him to show affirmatively
how the mistake occurred, or whether it happened from some
defect in the instrument which the company used, or the incompetency or inexperience of the company's operators, or of any omission of duty by the company or its officers. The mistake being
admitted, the legal presumption was that it was caused by one or
other of those causes, or all of them combined; and it was incumbent on the defendant to overcome that presumption, by showing
that, in the transmission and delivery of the message, it exercised
proper care and diligence, and that the mistake was not attributable
to its fault or negligence, or the fault or negligence of any of its
employees: Bartlett v. W. U. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209; Bittenhouse
v. Id. Line, 44 N. Y. 263; Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. *Co., 45 Id.
1
744; Belle v. W. U. Tel. Co., 55 Texas 308.
The defendant, however, did give evidence which tended to
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prove that, during the transmission of the message, "fog and
wind and a heavy storm prevailed," that owing to that state of the
weather, the word "bail," in the message, was changed to the word
"bain," and that the change was caused by what is known among
telegraph operators as a "false signal, caused by the breaking of
the current." Upon that question the superintendent of the company gave the following testimony:
"A. There are various causes that make the working of a telegraph wire uncertain even in good weather; faults in the instruments-unavoidable onds-may cause errors in the transmission of
words or letters. Generally errors of this kind are'caused by high
winds, which bring two wires together or switch the limb of a tree
against the wire, causing a momentary variation of the strength of
the current. Dense fogs will also have the same effect.
" Q. Take the word 'bail,' written with a dash and three dots,
a dot and a dash, two dots and a dash, assuming that word to have
been correctly sent from the Stockton office to San Francisco, could
the final '1' be changed to 'n,' so as to reach San Francisco as
'bain,' not ' bail T
",A. A great many atmospheric influences could cause an error
of that kind. It is called a false signal, caused by the breaking of
the current. In this case there was a momentary break in the
current, and that break might have made three dots ; in this case
it made only one additional dot at the end. If it broke in the
middle it would make the letter ' M.'"
Still, however that may be, the mistake, whether it resulted
from the negligence of the company or from natural causes beyond
its control, could have been discovered and corrected if the message had been repeated; that is, sent back to the Stockton office
for comparison with the original message. The company could
have tested its accuracy in that way before delivery, if it was properly equipped for the performance of its functions. That it was
so equipped, is evident from the admitted fact that the operator at
San Francisco repeated the message for the purpose of discovering
whether the word "falun," in the message, had been correctly
transmitted.
But the contention is, that the plaintiff should have ordered the
message repeated in order to secure its accuracy, because he had it
transmitted under an agreement between him and the company,
which reads as follows:
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"All messages taken by this company are subject to the following terms: To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender of
a message should order it. repeated; that is, telegraphed back to
the originating offic6 for comparison. For this, one-half the regular rate is charged in addition. It is agreed between the sender
of the following message and this company, that said company
shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or
delivery, or for non-delivery, of any unrepeated message, whether
happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the
amount received for sending the same; nor for mistakes or delays
in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any repeated
message, beyond fifty times the sum received for sending the same,
unless specially insured, nor in any case for delays arising from
unavoidable interruption in the working of its lines, or for errors
in cipher or obscure messages.""
The message sent was in cipher, the sender did not explain its
meaning nor order it to be repeated. Two questions, therefore,
arose out of the case as it was submitted to the jury, namely: 1.
Was the mistake the result of the negligence of the defendant or
its officers, or of natural causes beyond their control ? 2. Was the
agreement, under which the message was transmitted and delivered,
a defence to the action, or a restriction upon the liability of the
defendant?
Upon the first of these questions the court instructed the jury as
follows:
"The question for you to determine is one of fact. Whether or
not plaintiff's loss was caused by the gross negligence of the defendant or its agents.
"If the jury believe from the evidence that a mistake was made
in transmitting the message through the gross negligence of the
defendant or of its servants, the verdict must be for the plaintiff.
"The defendant, however, as a defence to the action, insists that
the message in question was what is known as an unrepeated message, and it contends, that in the case of such messages, it is only
liable for the amount received by it for sending the message.
"If the jury believe that a mistake was made by the defendant,
or its agents, in transmitting the message, through the gross negligence of the defendant, then defendant is responsible for the damage plaintiff suffered by reason of such mistake in transmitting said
message, although the jury believe that plaintiff used one of the
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forms of defendant having the terms printed at the top, as set out
in defendant's answer, and that plaintiff assented and agreed to
such terms, and did not require said message to be repeated or its
correct tiansmission insured."
And upon the second question it refused to give the following
instructions, which the defendant requested:
"If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff's original
message was written upon one of the blanks of the defendant, and
was an unrepeated message, the defendant is only liable to the
plaintiff in this action for the amount received .by it for transmitting the same, to wit, the sum of thirty cents (80c.).
"The defendant also alleges, as a defence, that the plaintiff's
message was what is known as a cipher message; that is to say,
that the true contents and meaning of the plaintiff's telegram
were by him intentionally concealed from the defendant by the use
of words arbitrarily selected, and having a different meaning from
that ordinarily attached to them. If the jury believe, from the
evidence, that the said message was, in fact, a cipher dispatch, and
that no explanation was made to the defendant hy the sender of
said message, of the meaning, object or purpose of said message,
then whatever damage the plaintiff may have sustained by reason
of any mistake in said message must be borne by himself, and the
defendant is only liable to the plaintiff for the amount received by
it for transmitting the same, to wit, the sum of thirty cents (80c.),
and no more."
It is objected that the instructions which the court gave to the
jury were erroneous, because they were grounded upon the assumption of a fact; viz., gross negligence, of which there was no proof
and no evidence from which it could be inferred: and because they
ignored altogether a fact of which there was evidence, viz.: that
the mistake was caused by circumstances which were beyond the
control of the company.
But, as has been already shown, the company was bound by law
to the exercise of great "care and diligence;" and if it failed to
perform for the plaintiff the duty which it undertook, the plaintiff,
upon proof of the failure and of the loss caused thereby, made out
a primafavie case which entitled him to recover. That being so,
it was in no way prejudicial to the defendant to characterize the
want of great care and diligence, which occasioned the loss, as
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gross negligence. Indeed, the phrase was more favorable to the
defendant than if the court had merely used the term negligence.
There has been .no legislative attempt to establish degrees in
negligence since the repeal of sect. 17, C. C. Construed as an
ordinary phrase, the. term "gross negligence," as used by the court
in its instructions to the jury, may, therefore, be considered as
the equivalent of that want of great care and diligence exacted by
the code of the company in the performance of its duties. The
absence of such care and diligence as the circumstances demanded,
would be therefore gross negligence. "Gross negligence," says
ROLFE, Baron, in Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, "is the same
thing as negligence, with the addition of a vituperative epithet."
Any negligence is gross in one who undertakes a duty and fails to
perform it: Lord v. Midland Rd. Co., L. R., 2 0. P. 339. The
tendency of judicial opinion is adverse to any distinction between the
two expressions. "Strictly speaking," says BRADLEY, J., in
Railroad Co. v.'Lockwood, 17 Wall. 382, "these expressions are
indicative rather of the degree of care and diligence which is due
from a party and which he fails to perform, than of the amount of
inattention, carelessness or stupidity which he exhibits. If very
little care is due from him, and he fails to bestow that little, it is
called gross negligence. If very great care is due, and he fails to
come up to the mark required, it is called slight negligence. And
if ordinary care is due, such as a prudent man would exercise 'in
his own affairs, failure to bestow that amount of care is called
ordinary negligence. In each case the negligence, whatever epithet we give it, is failure to bestow the care and skill which the
situation demands; and hence, it is more strictly accurate perhaps,
to call it simply "negligence :" 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 453; Wilson v.
Brett, supra; H'inton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 661 ; PhiladelpiaRd.
Co. v. -Derby, 14 How. 486; Steamboat N. W. v. King, 16 Id.
474.
The instructions which the court gave to the jury were correct
so far as they went. But it is contended that they did not go far
enough, becduse they did not contain any instruction upon the evidence in the case, that the mistake in the message resulted from
uncontrollable natural causes.
It would certainly have been the proper thing to have covered
that point by the instructions. But if the instructions given in
the case were incomplete, because they did not present the law
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applicable to all the points for which both parties contended, it was
the right and privilege of either party to ask for proper instructions
upon any omitted point. This was not done, and the party who
failed in -that respect to exercise his right cannot now be heard to
complain. It is well settled that a party cannot, in a court of
error, avail himself of an omission in the charge of the court, where
he made no request to the court on the subject: People v. Ah
Yute, 53 Cal. 613; People v. Ah Wee, 48 Id. 237 ; People v.
Collins, Id. 277; -Express Co. v. Kuntze, 8 Wall. 342 ; Jorer
v. Carpenter, 27 L. 1. 0. P. 1.
The last assignment of error is, that the court improperly refused to give the instructions asked by the defendant.
The plaintiff made out a primafacie case. That case could not
be overcome by any mere rules or regulations of the company. As
already stated, the company could not, by its rules and regulations,
absolve itself or its officers from the exercise of that great care
and diligence which the law and the circumstances of the case
d~manded.
One of the plainest of its obligations is to transmit and deliver
the very message prescribed. "To follow copy, an imperative law
of the printing office, is equally applicable to the telegraph office :"
N. Y. & W. Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298. That
could have been done without understanding the meaning of the
words used in the message, and the sender was not bound to
explain it. Although the words may have been a jargon to the
officers of the company, the officers were bound, without regard to
the meaning of the words, to transmit and deliver them as they
were written, and, if that could have been done by repeating the
message, the duty would seem to have been upon them to have had
it repeated, in order to secure accuracy in its transmission and
delivery.
The Western Union v. Blanehard, 68 Ga. 309, was an action
to recover damages for a mistake in a cipher dispatch caused by
the fault of the operator, and it was insisted, by way of defence,
that the company was not liable for the consequences of the mistake
beyond the amount fixed by the agreement, between the sender
and the company, which, in its terms, was similar to the agreement
in this case. But the court said: "We can only say that any rule
or regulation of the company which seeks to relieve it from performing its duty belonging to the employment, with integrity,
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skill and diligence, contravenes public policy as well as the law,
and under it the party at fault cannot seek refuge. If it become
necessary for the company, in transmitting messageswith integrity,
skill and diligence, to secure accuracy to have said messages
repeated, then the law devolves upon it that duty to meet its
requirements. Wekno w of no law in this state that limits their
tolls on messages; this is under their own control. A message
must be transmitted with integrity, skill and diligence, and the
mode of attaining accuracy in such work they have at their command-the compensation paid therefor the law does not seek to
limit or restrict: 28 Ga. 543; 58 Id. 433; 34 Id. 215; 1 Daly
Cases 288; 29 Md. 222; 27 Iowa 432; 60 Me. 530."
The rule or regulation as to repeating a message is therefore not
sanctioned by law; and to say that telegraph companies shall only
be liable for the amounts received for transmission, is practically to
excuse them altogether. So, in Tyler v. . U. Tel. Co., 60 Ill.
421, the Supreme Court of Illinois said: "On the assumption
that it is the duty of the company to transmit correctly the message for which they have received compensation, where, in law,
arises any obligation on the part of the sender to repeat the message? * * * And as the receiver of the message, it was not his
duty to telegraph back to ascertain the correctness of the message.
The company was bound to send the message correctly in the first
instance. * * * We fail to perceive any consideration whatever on
which to base the so-called contract, that the sender shall order the
message repeated. The company have no right to demand of the
sender an assurance for the faithfulness of their own conduct.
Such a contract, forced as it is upon the sender, is not of any legal
or binding force."
Upon the subject of the liability of the company for a mistake in
the transmission of an unrepeated message, there is, undoubtedly,
a conflict of authorities; but as we have already stated the rule
deducible from all the cases is, that a mistake in the transmission
of a message is primafacie evidence of negligence, and the burden
is on the company to show to the contrary; and if it be found that
the mistake was due to the negligence of the company or its servants, the company is liable for all the loss occasioned by it, and the
special contract between the company and the sender, for the transmission of the message, is no defence. But if it be found that the
mistake was not due to the negligence of the company, the defendVOL. X=1X
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